Volume 17 (2021)
Klaus Vibe
Fjellhaug International University College, Aarhus, Denmark
This study argues that Philo’s thoughts about freedom from necessity presume a Platonic notion of the concept of necessity, even though Philonic scholarship tend to refer to Stoic notions of that concept in their explanations of relevant passages from Philo’s writings. This study explains how the concept of necessity is used in Plato’s Republic and Plato’s Timaeus. On this basis it is argued that Philo’s various references to necessity in Leg. All. 1–3 reflects a Platonic rather than a Stoic notion of that concept and that Philo uses the concept in a similar way in Deus Imm. 47–49. This study concludes that Philo’s notion of a relative free will is rooted in his convictions regarding what it means to live as a composite, bodily human being and thus not in his convictions regarding divine providence.