

AD HERENNIUM ARGUMENT STRATEGIES IN 1 CORINTHIANS

Robert Stephen Reid

University of Dubuque, Dubuque, IA

The ‘Now concerning the matters about which you wrote...’ turn-of-phrase at 1 Cor. 7.1 has been at the heart of a contemporary debate; that is, whether Paul’s letter should be analyzed by the classic genre conventions of the *partes orationis* system of rhetoric that have provided such insight for his other letters.<sup>1</sup> Hurd originally hypothesized that the letter should be read as a historically-situated set of reactions, first to the oral report Paul had from Chloe’s people and then, starting at 7.1, as responses to various matters posed in a letter from the community. Further instances of this ‘Now concerning...’ phrase occur at 7.25; 8.1; 12.1; and 16.1, 12. Mitchell responded by arguing that continued use of this phrase in the second half of the letter is more a ‘topic marker’ than an implied reference to multiple questions triggered by a letter. Though her argument that use of this phrase does not prove that the structure of the second half of the letter was controlled by queries from the Corinthians has merit, her challenge needs to be seen in light of her own contention that a *prothesis* at 1.10 actually provides the controlling structure of the letter.<sup>2</sup> She argues for a deliberative arrangement of the letter controlled by a thesis calling for unity at 1.10, a

1. For the basic debate, see James Coolidge Hurd, Jr, *The Origins of 1 Corinthians* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1983); Margaret Mitchell, ‘Concerning  $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\ \delta\grave{\epsilon}$  in 1 Cor.’, *NovT* 31 (1989), pp. 229-56; *idem*, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1991). Cf. Ben Witherington, III, *Conflict and Community in Corinth: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on 1 and 2 Corinthians* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995).

2. Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, p. 202.

statement of the facts at 1.11-17, and a topically-controlled collection of proofs from 1.18–15.57.

Porter notes that Mitchell's argument has dominated recent analysis of the argument strategies of this letter, but also notes that other critics have urged caution toward this tendency to partition Paul's epistolary argument as if the letter must be controlled by the genres of oratory.<sup>3</sup> Letter writers could clearly engage deliberative, judicial, and epideictic concerns without having to structure their letter with a controlling thesis. Still other critics question whether there is even demonstrable evidence that Paul made *conscious* use of the Greco-Roman rhetorical tradition.<sup>4</sup> The intersection of questions at stake is whether Paul's letters offer demonstrable proof that he made conscious use of the Greek handbook tradition and whether that proof depends on his use of the *partes orationis* to partition the argument of the letters.

The purpose of this study is to argue that, in the composition of 1 Corinthians, Paul made extensive and *conscious* use of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium's* Complete Argument (2.18.28–29.46) and limited and *conscious* use of the handbook's argument by Amplification of a Theme (4.43.56–44.57) as a means to conduct argument. In making an argument for *conscious* dependence on a rhetorical tradition, I am not

3. Stanley E. Porter, 'Paul of Tarsus and his Letters', in Stanley E. Porter (ed.), *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period 330 BC–AD 400* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997), pp. 551-54. David E. Aune, 'Paul', *The Westminster Dictionary of New Testament and Early Christian Literature and Rhetoric* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003), p. 343; Jeffrey T. Reed, 'Using Ancient Rhetorical Categories to Interpret Paul's Letters: A Question of Genre', in Stanley E. Porter and Thomas H. Olbricht (eds.), *Rhetoric in the New Testament: Essays from the 1992 Heidelberg Conference* (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993), pp. 292-324; *idem*, 'The Epistle', in Porter (ed.), *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric*, pp. 533-86. For a broad overview of the rhetoric of letter-writing, see Stanley K. Stowers, *Letter Writing in Greco-Roman Antiquity* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986), pp. 107-109.

4. R. Dean Anderson, Jr, *Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Paul* (Leuven: Peeters, rev. edn, 1999), p. 290. Anderson provides a comprehensive engagement with the evidence offered over the last quarter century for Paul's dependence on the rhetorical tradition and argues for a minimalist approach. However, Eriksson argues that Anderson's analysis creates a dichotomy between theory and practice, reducing the conception of rhetoric to style, a view that treats rhetoric as the practice of eloquence. He argues that this would be an understanding of the function of rhetoric closer to that held at the outset of the twentieth century than the view held at the outset of the twenty-first century. See Anders Eriksson, *Tradition as Rhetorical Proof: Pauline Argumentation in 1 Corinthians* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1998), p. 29.

arguing that the letter should be read as a treatise controlled by one of the genres. In fact, my argument will demonstrate significant flaws with Mitchell's deliberative partition of the opening 'chapter' of the letter. Rather, I accept Mitchell's contention for a topical organization of the various arguments without requiring that the letter be controlled by the assertion of a single thesis.

Secondly, in making an argument for conscious dependence, I am not proposing that Paul made specific use of this Latin handbook. By its own prefatory testimony (1.1.1; cf. 4.1.1), the *Ad Herennium* states that it represents a distillation of that which its writer drew from a Rhodian handbook tradition that we no longer possess.<sup>5</sup> Instead, I wish to pursue further a thesis I developed for a reading of the argument of 1 Corinthians 14, that Paul's argument strategies in 1 Corinthians consistently demonstrate a *conscious* dependence on the reasoning structures of the Rhodian rhetoric found in the *Ad Herennium* and that Paul subordinated his own preference for a Semitic style of symmetrical reasoning to the linear rationality of this Greek strategy of persuasive argument.<sup>6</sup>

5. Harry Caplan, 'Introduction', Cicero, *Ad C. Herennium de Ratione Dicendi Rhetorica ad Herennium* (LCL; trans. and ed. Harry Caplan; Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press and William Heinemann, 1954), p. xv; cf. James J. Murphy, 'The Codification of Roman Rhetoric with a Synopsis of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*', in James J. Murphy and Richard Katula (eds.), *A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric* (Davis, CA: Hermagoras Press, 2nd edn, 1995), pp. 11-127 (115-16).

6. Robert Stephen Reid, 'Paul's Conscious Use of the *Ad Herennium*'s "Complete Argument"', *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 35.2 (2005), pp. 65-92. My use of the term 'symmetrical reasoning' includes what other writers traditionally refer to as ring composition (e.g. Stanley K. Stowers, *A Re-Reading of Romans: Justice, Jews, and the Gentiles* [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994], p. 11), but also includes the use of step parallelism. Porter and Reed rightly argue that identification of 'macro-chiasms' is a modern scholarly construct unknown to ancient rhetoricians; see Stanley E. Porter and Jeffrey T. Reed, 'Philippians as a Macro-Chiasm and Its Exegetical Significance', *NTS* 44 (1998), pp. 213-31. Of course, ring composition and concentric parallelism as devices of composition even for whole works are demonstrably ubiquitous in ancient prose composition; what is missing from ancient literature is any specific discussion of this form of composition, apart from negative allusions to it in Dionysius of Halicarnassus. On the use of symmetrical parallelism as a Semitic convention of reasoning in composition, see Roland Meynet, *Rhetorical Analysis: An Introduction to Biblical Rhetoric* (JSOTSup, 256; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998); *idem*, 'The Question at the Center: A Specific Device of Rhetorical Argumentation in Scripture', in Anders Eriksson, Thomas H. Olbricht and

Argument in support of both claims is advanced in this essay by way of a rhetorical analysis of schematized demonstrations of the letter's first use of the Complete Argument at 1 Cor. 1.10-31 and the letter's first use of the Amplification of a Theme strategy of argument at 9.1-27.<sup>7</sup> Paul's negotiation of these two approaches to reasoning represents a significant demonstration of first-century cross-cultural reasoning. Before turning to a rhetorical analysis of two discrete arguments in the Corinthian text, the distinction between formal argument as described by Cicero and Quintilian and persuasive argument as found in the *Ad Herennium* needs clarification.

Walter Übelacker (eds.), *Rhetorical Argumentation in Biblical Texts: Essays from the Lund 2000 Conference* (Emory Studies in Early Christianity, 8; Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2002), pp. 200-214; Michael Fishbane, *Text and Texture: Close Readings of Selected Biblical Texts* (New York: Schocken Books, 1979); J.P. Fokkelman, *Reading Biblical Narrative: An Introductory Guide* (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 1999); Ian H. Thompson, *Chiasmus in the Pauline Letters* (JSNTSup, 111; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995); John Breck, *The Shape of Biblical Language: Chiasmus in the Scriptures and Beyond* (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1994) and John W. Welch, 'Chiasmus in the New Testament', in John W. Welch (ed.), *Chiasmus in Antiquity: Structures, Analyses, Exegesis* (Provo: Research Press, 1981), pp. 211-49. On the inventional use of symmetrical parallelism in Greco-Roman rhetoric, see Robert Stephen Reid, "'Neither Oratory nor Dialogue": Dionysius of Halicarnassus and the Genre of Plato's *Apology*', *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 27.4 (1997), pp. 63-90; and Ian Worthington, *A Historical Commentary on Dinarchus: Rhetoric and Conspiracy in Later Fourth Century Athens* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992).

7. Apart from the introduction (1.1-9), the conclusion (16.19-24), and the encomium in ch. 13, only two portions of the letter (7.1-40 and 6.1-18) resist analysis by either the Complete Argument or the Amplification of a Theme Argument. It is paramount to note that the rhetorical schematizations made evident in the Appendices array the parallels of the text to make them apparent for modern readers. This formal manner of schematizing the structure of Semitic reasoning would be alien to those who originally composed argument in this manner. Symmetrical strategies of reasoning were quite probably intuitive, native forms of reasoning in Asian cultures. Dionysius of Halicarnassus may deplore the tendency to reduce argument to parallelistic reasoning (especially its Asianist expression), but it would be a misreading to assume that ancient writers like Paul worked out schematizations in the rather mechanical fashion we moderns are reduced to in an effort to suggest this mode of thought.

1. *Formal Versus Persuasive Argument in Antiquity*

Critics of argument strategies in the first century CE traditionally have looked to the model of logical argument development found in Cicero's *De Inventione* and Quintilian's summary of rhetorical argument summarized by Lausberg, rather than the strategies for making persuasive argument found in the *Ad Herennium*. For argument in Greek, they have tended to look to the elite Athenian rhetoric for models of argument. However, Enos has argued that of the three first-century schools of Greek rhetoric—Athenian, Rhodian and Asianist—Rhodian rhetoric was the only one that was a functional cross-cultural rhetoric for the ethnically-diverse communities of the Mediterranean world.<sup>8</sup> The problem, of course, is that most critique of ancient rhetoric tends to look to these elite summaries rather than popular rhetorics. For example, Lausberg's influential *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric* does not treat the argument strategies found in the *Ad Herennium* as a significant part of his primary summary of the ancient argument tradition (§§371-372).<sup>9</sup> Instead, Lausberg chooses to catalog them as a briefly noted alternative to rational argument (§1244—*ratiocinatio*). Following Anderson, the present study challenges this over-reliance on Lausberg in assessing strategies of argument in Greco-Roman literature.<sup>10</sup> In critiquing this problem, Anderson recommends that critics would do well to attend to argument strategies found in the Rhodian rhetoric of the *Ad Herennium*.<sup>11</sup>

This lack of attention does not arise from the obscurity of the book. In fact, for more than a millennium, the *Ad Herennium*, together with *De Inventione*, were two of the most widely-disseminated works of western literature. Following Lausberg, Murphy argues that the *Ad Herennium*

8. Richard L. Enos, 'The Art of Rhetoric at Rhodes: An Eastern Rival to the Athenian Representation of Classical Rhetoric', in Carol S. Lipson and Roberta A. Binkley (eds.), *Rhetoric Before and Beyond the Greeks* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2004), pp. 183-96 (186).

9. Heinrich Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric: A Foundation for Literary Study* (trans. Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen and David E. Orton; ed. David E. Orton and R. Dean Anderson; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1998).

10. R. Dean Anderson, Jr, 'The Use and Abuse of Lausberg in Biblical Studies', Eriksson *et al.* (eds.), *Rhetorical Argumentation*, pp. 66-76.

11. Anderson, 'Use and Abuse of Lausberg', p. 76.



had little influence in antiquity.<sup>12</sup> However, with Jerome's commendation in the fourth century, Cicero was credited as its author and the *Ad Herennium* was seen as fulfilling the promised completion of the *De Inventione* 2.178 (cf. 1.9), providing treatments of delivery (*Ad Her.* 3.19-27), memory (3.28-40), and, most notably, style (4). During the Renaissance, the two works were known as *rhetorica prima* and *rhetorica secunda*, the essential books for anyone who sought to understand the art of rhetoric. The *Ad Herennium* was still seen as seconding *De Inventione*'s overview of rhetoric even after it was determined in the modern era that Cicero was not its author. In fact, books One and Two of *De Inventione* parallel the treatment of the *Ad Herennium* so closely that writers since the Renaissance have preferred to discuss invention and arrangement based on Cicero's two-volume treatment, turning to the *rhetorica secunda* only for treatments of the remainder of rhetoric's canons. This is still the standard approach.<sup>13</sup>

There is, however, one area in which the presentation in the first two books of the *Ad Herennium* differs from that of Cicero: the nature and division of *argumentatio*. A conception of *argumentatio* less complicated than Cicero's logical argument design in *De Inventione* is found in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*'s discussion of the five-fold *epicheiremata* appropriate for use in the Proof and Refutation sections of a speech.<sup>14</sup> The presentation has been treated as a misunderstanding of the common Greek tradition of argument that informs Cicero's treatment of the

12. Murphy, 'The Codification of Roman Rhetoric', p. 116.

13. George A. Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 112-25.

14. With the proposal of the enthymeme, Aristotle had provided the basis of rhetorical reasoning constructed as a partial emulation of the tripartite logical syllogism. The epicheireme was considered a more complex form of argument with four premises and a conclusion. Solmsen notes that authors generally treat the enthymeme as a reduced form of the syllogism and the epicheireme as an extended form of it (p. 170). However, the author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* shows little interest in discussing a quinquepartite argument as a version of syllogistic reasoning. The author is more interested in what is accomplished by each division of a complete argument rather than reducing each element to a single-sentence premise. His own example offers two sentences in development of the Proof of the Reason and five sentences in development of the Embellishment (2.29.28-29). Friedrich Solmsen, 'The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric', *AJP* 62 (1941), pp. 35-50 and 169-90; reprinted in Keith Erickson (ed.), *The Classical Heritage of Rhetoric* (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow, 1974), pp. 278-309.

rhetorical syllogism or epicheireme. On the other hand, Caplan wisely observes that the author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* has the practical speaker in mind rather than syllogistic reasoning posing as speech intended to persuade listeners.<sup>15</sup>

Instead of demonstrating concern with formal ‘legs’, reasoning in the *Ad Herennium* is structured to persuade a general audience concerning the subject at issue:

The most complete and perfect argument is that which is comprised of five parts: The Proposition (*propositio*), the Reason (*ratio*), the Proof of the Reason (*confirmatio*), the Embellishment (*exornatio*), and the Résumé (*complexio*). Through the Proposition we set forth summarily what we intend to prove. The Reason, by means of a brief explanation, sets forth the causal basis for the proposition, establishing the truth of what we are urging. The Proof of the Reason corroborates, by means of additional arguments, the briefly presented Reason. Embellishment we use in order to adorn and enrich the argument, after the proof has been established. The Résumé is a brief conclusion, drawing together the parts of the argument (2.18.28).

Following the assertion of a proposition, a justifying reason, and its extended proof, the Complete Argument encourages rhetors to adorn the argument by embellishing it. As one of the legs of making argument, Embellishment is original to the *Ad Herennium*. Other writers tended to treat embellishment as an aspect of style, but here it functions as part of the reasoning process that proves persuasive for listeners.<sup>16</sup> Occasionally, if an argument was brief, the embellishment and even the final résumé were dispensed with, but the strategy of persuasive argument in the *Ad Herennium* differs markedly from Cicero’s strategy of logical argument by fore-fronting the argument, establishing its proof, and then treating what others considered a stylistic device as an essential element of argument. There are eleven instances of the use of this Complete Argument in 1 Corinthians: 1.10-31; 2.1–4.21; 5.1-13; 6.1-11; 6.12-20; 8.1-13;

15. Caplan, *Ad Her.*, p. 106 note b.

16. Notice that in treating the Complete Argument as attending to persuasive rather than to logical argument, I am differing from the kind of assessment of critics like Clarke who contended that the Complete Argument ‘represents as much as the ordinary Latin teacher could assimilate of the general principles of argumentation as developed by the rhetoricians of Greece. For a general consideration of the topics of argument we turn to *De Inventione*’; see M.L. Clarke, *Rhetoric at Rome: A Historical Survey, with a New Introduction by D.H. Berry* (London: Routledge, 3rd rev. edn, 1996 [1953]), p. 30.

11.2-16; 11.17-34; 12.1-30; 14.1-40 and 15.1-11. My analysis of its use in 1.10-31 problematizes Mitchell's partitioning of the letter's argument.<sup>17</sup>

The *Rhetorica ad Herennium* offers a second form of *argumentatio* described as 'refining' a theme (*Expolitio*) at 4.42.54–4.43.58 which involves dwelling on a subject using various figures of diction:

when we descant upon the same theme (*tractatio*) we shall use a great many variations. Indeed, after having expressed the theme simply we can subjoin the Reason[s], and then express the theme in another form, with or without the Reasons; next we can present the Contrary; then a Comparison and an Example; and finally the Conclusion (4.43.56).

The Amplification on a Theme is presented as an extended figure of thought especially appropriate to the stylistic development of the Embellishment section of a Complete Argument (4.44.58; cf. Lausberg §§830-831); that is, an embellished Complete Argument. It was later developed in the *progymnasmata* of Theon and Hermogenes and became a strategy of reasoning that served as one of the introductory exercises in the ancient rhetorical classroom. Students were required to learn how to use it to amplify, say, an aphorism attributed to a famous individual, or to refute a myth, and so on.<sup>18</sup> Three instances of this more elaborate form of the Complete Argument occur in the letter (1 Cor. 9.1-27; 10.1–11.1; and 15.12-58).<sup>19</sup> Robbins has already identified 1 Cor. 9.1-27 as an example of this argument structure.<sup>20</sup> In this essay, I take up and commend his turn to the *Ad Herennium*, but note where his analysis falters on the internal logic within each division of the Amplification of a Theme.

While Robbins has led the way by employing the Amplification of a Theme in Pauline argument, the Complete Argument has received scant

17. For an analysis of the remainder of the first major argument of 1 Corinthians as the letter's second instance of a Complete Argument, see Robert Stephen Reid, 'The Rhetorical Strategy of Paul's Anti-Rhetorical Argument in 1 Cor. 2–4', in Elizabeth Vander Lei and Tom Amorose (eds.), *Inquiries into Rhetoric and Christian Tradition* (forthcoming).

18. H.I. Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity* (trans. George Lamb; New York: New American Library, 1964), pp. 238-42.

19. Anders Eriksson notes two uses of this argument strategy in 1 Corinthians at 8.7-13 and 1.14-22, in *Tradition as Rhetorical Proof*, pp. 160 and 166 respectively.

20. Vernon K. Robbins, *The Tapestry of Early Christian Discourse: Rhetoric, Society, and Ideology* (New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 65-95.



attention. It has been overshadowed by our access to Aristotle and Cicero. Of course the problem in all this is that the *Ad Herennium* provides a more adequate account of the real practice of cross-cultural persuasive argument in the first century CE and is, therefore, more suitable for critique of the epistolary literature.

## 2. *Argument and Structure in 1 Corinthians*

Assessment of Paul's rhetorical skill in composing strategies of argument tend to be of three kinds: treatments of his rabbinic reasoning, treatments of his reasoning by way of Semitic symmetries, and treatments of his reasoning by way of argument according to the Greco-Roman rhetorical handbook tradition. Critics who approach Pauline argument as rabbinic reasoning tend to reconstruct this type of Jewish argument through its exegetical practice,<sup>21</sup> while others, like Chilton and Neusner, are still tentative when it comes to whether Paul uses rabbinic reasoning.<sup>22</sup> Their reticence reflects the problem of identifying what constitutes 'rabbinic reasoning' in this period.<sup>23</sup> Efforts to reconstruct rabbinic argument as a reasoning strategy during the first centuries BCE and CE tend to be concerned with demonstrating how its interest in legal and ethical matters was conducted as a kind of procedural rhetoric—as a 'midrashic interpretation' of sacred texts. For example, Schnabel

21. Anthony T. Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology* (London: SPCK, 1974), pp. 126-68; Daniel Patte, *Early Jewish Hermeneutic in Palestine* (SBLDS, 22; Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1975); David Instone Brewer, *Techniques and Assumptions in Jewish Exegesis before 70 CE* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1992); Eckhard J. Schnabel, *Law and Wisdom from Ben Sira to Paul: A Tradition Historical Enquiry into the Relation of Law, Wisdom, and Ethics* (Tübingen : J.C.B. Mohr, 1985); and *idem*, 'Exegetical Methods in Second Temple Judaism', retrieved on July 8, 2005 at <http://tiunet.tiu.edu/faculty/eschnabel/resources/NT621%20The%20Synoptic%20Gospels%20and%20Johannine%20Literature/Exegetical%20Methods%20in%20Second%20Temple%20Judaism.pdf>.

22. Bruce Chilton and Jacob Neusner, *Judaism in the New Testament: Practices and Beliefs* (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 60-62; cf. Bruce Chilton and Jacob Neusner, *Classical Christianity and Rabbinic Judaism: Comparing Theologies* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic Books, 2004).

23. Neusner is clearly more reluctant than Chilton to think of Paul in terms of a rabbinic sage. Cf. Jacob Neusner, *Judaism when Christianity Began: A Survey of Belief and Practice* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2002), p. 93; with Bruce Chilton, *Rabbi Paul: An Intellectual Biography* (New York: Doubleday, 2004), pp. 28-47.

summarizes the general findings about Second Temple rabbinic reasoning as evincing the following characteristics: (1) distinct separation of biblical text and commentary; (2) explicit quotation of the biblical text; (3) introduction of the biblical text by quotation formulae; (4) reference to rabbis as authors or tradents of one of several possible interpretations; and (5) frequent reference to the hermeneutic rule, which is used in the interpretation (e.g. Hillel's seven *middoth*: *qal wa-homer*—from the easier or less important case to the more difficult or more significant case, or vice-versa; *gezera shawa*—the analogical interpretation of one text in the light of another text with which it shares a word or a phrase; and so on).<sup>24</sup>

Bruns wisely cautions against over-reading the procedural nature of this formulaic approach to reasoning:

we ought to think of midrash as a form of life (in Wittgenstein's sense) rather than simply as a form of exegesis (in the technical sense)... That is, midrash is concerned to tell about the force of the text as well as to address its problems of form and meaning.<sup>25</sup>

Although Paul clearly makes use of the typical rabbinic Scripture citation technique as a form of proof, it would be anachronistic to use rabbinic Judaism's categories of reasoning as the primary means to assess his strategies of reasoning.<sup>26</sup> In addition, critics who consider this rhetoric have not offered any proposal for its inventional character in the letter—especially with reference to the letter's governing logic. Where relevant, aspects of Paul's rabbinic style of citing Scripture as proof will be noted.

Critics who approach the reading of epistolary argument by way of the general Semitic forms of symmetrical reasoning do have suggestions for the inventional logic of the governing structure of the letter. Bailey provides the most comprehensive analysis of the letter's structure and its symmetries within the division of its structures.<sup>27</sup> Other writers have

24. Schnabel, 'Exegetical Methods'.

25. Gerald Bruns, *Hermeneutics: Ancient and Modern* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 105.

26. On Paul's use of Scripture citation as authoritative proof, see Christopher Stanley, *Paul and the Language of Scripture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

27. Kenneth E. Bailey, 'The Structure of *1 Corinthians* and Paul's Theological Method with Special Reference to 4.17', *NovT* 25 (1983), pp. 152-81; Bailey, '*1 Corinthians*: An Analysis of its Rhetorical Forms', copyrighted conference presentation handouts, Whitworth College Institute of Ministry, July 1987. Bailey's

provided alternative proposals for the outlines of the letter's balanced arrangement of involutive reasoning in broader brushstrokes.<sup>28</sup> No consensus for the symmetrical analysis has emerged, nor has any one proposal been generally accepted by proponents of this perspective. However, one point shared in common by most symmetrical proposals is the role Paul's defense of his ministry at 1 Cor. 9.1-27 plays as the fulcrum or central argument of the letter.<sup>29</sup> As noted below, this argument represents the first instance of the Amplification of a Theme as a strategy of argument in the letter. It is typical to shift the structuring pattern of parallelism to indicate a central point of turning in Semitic symmetrical strategies of reasoning. It may be that this penchant is carried over here as a means to alert the Greek recipients of this letter that this argument is at the heart of the matter in the letter.<sup>30</sup>

copyrighted handouts are extensive, providing a schematized analysis of the symmetrical parallelism of thought throughout the letter. Bailey sees Paul's strategy of argument in *I Corinthians* as organized by development of five thematic essays: Unity and the cross 1.10–4.16; Sex 4.17–7.40; Idols: obedience in freedom 8.1–11.1; Worship 11.2–14.40; and Resurrection 15.1–58. Though he does not argue for an overarching architectonic chiasmic structure for the letter, chiasmic symmetry serves as the primary means of analysis within these proposed 'essays'. In 1898, Bullinger suggested the following analysis without providing supporting argument: (A) 1.1-9; (B) 1.10–4.21; (C) 5–6; (C') 7–8; (B') 9–16.18, (A') 16.19-24 (p. 387). Note that Bullinger's differs from most symmetrical construals because it does not place Paul's Defense at the center of the letter's argument; E.W. Bullinger, *Figures of Speech Used in the Bible: Explained and Illustrated* (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1968 [1898]).

28. Breck, *The Shape of Biblical Language*, pp. 243-51.

29. Meynet observes, 'The third characteristic of Hebrew rhetoric is the specific manner in which it composes parallel dispositions and most of all concentric arrangements. Instead of developing its argumentation in a linear way, in the Greco-Roman fashion, to a conclusion which is the point of the resolution of the discourse, it is organized most of the time in an involutive manner around a center which is the focal point, the keystone, through which the rest finds cohesion,' *Rhetorical Analysis*, p. 175. On this significance of the central point-of-turning material, see also Meynet, 'The Question at the Center'.

30. In a previous study, *Preaching Mark*, I provided evidence that it is common for writers who compose by way of symmetrical reasoning to shift the rhythm of their typical reasoning strategy to indicate a central point of turning. For example, Mk 8.27–9.29 is generally accepted as the central narrative of Mark's Gospel. In my construal of the symmetrical design of the Gospel argument, I argue that this text shifts its pattern of involutive reasoning—A, B, B', A'—to step parallelism reasoning—I, II, I', II'—as a means of signaling that a shift or point-of-turning has

Critics who approach the reading of epistolary argument by way of the Greco-Roman rhetorical handbook tradition accept that Paul makes authoritative appeal to Scripture and to tradition in much the same way as critics who approach Pauline argument as rabbinic reasoning. They also assume that Paul uses rational argument and that this argument is premised on a shared horizon of understanding of how argument functions.<sup>31</sup> The latter requires a means of conducting argument cross-culturally. As noted above, most debate concerning the rhetoric of Paul's argument invention in 1 Corinthians focuses on two issues: first, on whether it is appropriate to argue that Paul made conscious use of the Greco-Roman rhetorical tradition of argument invention and, secondly, whether his rhetorical invention of argument in this letter was controlled by the kind of genre assumptions that require the letter's structure to be controlled by a single claim.

With regard to the first issue, some critics point to 1 Cor. 2.4 to argue that Paul rejected the art of making plausible argument as contrary to the truth that he urged readers to affirm. However, this text refers to Paul's lack of prowess as a speaker rather than a lack of rhetorical skill in the composition of argument. Through a fine example of his use of speech-in-character (*prosopopoiia*) in 2 Cor. 10.9-10, Paul gives voice to the purported complaint of his detractors concerning the power of his persuasive rhetoric: 'His letters are weighty (*βαρεῖαι*) and strong (*ἰσχυροί*), but his bodily presence is weak (*ἀσθενής*), and his speech contemptible (*ἐξουθενημένος*)'. The *Ad Herennium* comments on the effectiveness of this figure-of-thought as an appeal to pity (4.53.66; cf. Quintilian, *Inst. or.* 6.1.25-26), but in context (cf. 2 Cor. 10.1), it provides clear evidence that his opponents viewed him as a highly-skilled epistolary disputant. A century before, Dionysius of Halicarnassus had already treated *βαρύς* and *ἰσχυρός* as technical terms denoting trained rhetorical skill.<sup>32</sup> So Paul's ability to compose formidable prose

been reached in the argument. See Robert Stephen Reid, *Preaching Mark* (St Louis: Chalice Press, 1999), pp. 89-90. Paul's choice to shift from a Complete Argument strategy to argument by Amplification of a Theme could represent a similar conceptual shift.

31. On this argument, see Anthony C. Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), p. 50.

32. Contrary to Anderson's appraisal (*Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Paul*, p. 278), both *βαρύς* ("gravity" in the sense of "dignity"—in Roberts, p. 292) and

argument that would be accepted as plausible argument by rhetoricians is no longer in question.<sup>33</sup> In this sense, Classen's conditions of *unconscious* influence are met on the face of Paul's obvious skill in argumentation.<sup>34</sup> Though Classen has become convinced that Paul draws on an educated and *conscious* use of Greco-Roman rhetorical tradition, this use requires a more unambiguous demonstration of dependence.<sup>35</sup>

ἰσχυρός (variously: 'forceful style, powerful, firm, potent'—in van Wyk Cronjé, p. 220) clearly function as technical terminology for Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Anderson refers to a single use of ἰσχυρός as a technical term in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Thuc.* 34, and concludes that it entails 'no necessary allusion to rhetoric' (p. 278 n. 6). However, a glance at the glossaries of technical terms included in Roberts' study of *Comp.* and van Wyk Cronjé's study of *Dem.* reveals multiple uses of both terms in just two other works by Dionysius. By Anderson's own criterion of discovering parallels in the technical literature it becomes clear that Paul's writing style is being evaluated rhetorically. In fact, the chiasmic contrast implicit in the comparisons 'forceful' versus 'weak' and 'grave' speech versus 'contemptible speech' seems to demand the assumption that βαρύς should refer to the rhetorical quality of Paul's ability to compose arguments. See W.R. Roberts, 'Indices Dionysiacus', in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On Literary Composition: Being the Greek Text of the De Compositione Verborum* (trans. and ed. W.R. Roberts; London: Macmillan, 1910), index: pp. 285-334; Jacobus van Wyk Cronjé, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus: De Demosthene: A Critical Appraisal of the Status Quaestionis* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1986), index: pp. 174-280.

33. For the initial debate, see Stanley E. Porter, 'The Theoretical Justification for Application of Rhetorical Categories to Pauline Epistolary Literature', in Porter and Olbricht (eds.), *Rhetoric in the New Testament*, pp. 100-22; and *idem*, 'Paul of Tarsus and his Letters', pp. 535-36.

34. Classen originally proposed four alternatives to account for rhetorical features in an ancient first-century Hellenistic text: (1) the author is consciously applying rhetorical theory; (2) the author is successfully and consciously imitating the practice of others; (3) unconscious imitation of others; or (4) the author simply has a gift for effective communication. He concludes that Paul must have 'imbibed' rhetoric from others sometimes consciously and sometimes unconsciously. See Carl Joachim Classen, 'St Paul's Epistles and Ancient Greek and Roman Rhetoric', *Rhetorica* 10 (1992), pp. 319-34. Classen has since become convinced by his analysis of Paul's accurate use of the technical terms of Greek rhetoric throughout his letters; see Carl Joachim Classen, 'Paul and the Terminology of Ancient Greek Rhetoric' in his collection of essays, *Rhetorical Criticism in the New Testament* (Leiden: Brill Academic, 2002), pp. 29-44.

35. Classen, 'Paul and the Terminology', p. 44, concludes that Paul's technical use of rhetorical terminology signifies 'a standard of education which warrants the assumption that Paul was familiar through theory (handbooks) or practice (actual application) with the rules and precepts of ancient rhetoric and epistolography'.



With regard to the second issue, Mitchell and Witherington have both argued that the letter should be read as an example of deliberative rhetoric, while others suggest that letters like 1 Corinthians are

teacherly and epideictic, dialogue-like and hortatory: the audience of the letters are being instructed in correct 'rhetoric' in that they are given a number of warnings against composing, presenting, or tolerating certain kinds of discourse that Paul defines precisely in moral and spiritual, and not rhetorical terms.<sup>36</sup>

Other than contemporary rhetorical analysis that seeks to read the letter out of the constraints of a specific genre design there is little to suggest that first-century rhetoricians considered letter writing as a forum for forensic, deliberative or epideictic discourse.<sup>37</sup> Rather than treat the argument of 1 Corinthians with the divisions of the *partes orationis*, as if it is a treatise controlled by a single thesis in service to one of these genres, this study treats the letter's arguments topically, as if they can be evaluated discretely without forcing them to fit into a deliberative partitioning of the letter.

In conducting my analysis of the argument invention in the letter, I use the criteria of detailing the intersection between the Rhodian and the Semitic symmetrical strategies of reasoning that I developed in earlier studies.<sup>38</sup> In each instance it becomes obvious that Paul subordinates his symmetrical strategies of reasoning to the divisional logic of the *Ad Herennium* strategies of persuasive reasoning.

36. C. Jan Swearington, 'The Tongues of Men: Understanding Greek Rhetorical Sources for Paul's Letters to the Romans and 1 Corinthians', in Eriksson *et al.* (eds.), *Rhetorical Argumentation in Biblical Texts*, pp. 232-42 (235); cf. Dale Sullivan and Christian Anible, 'The Epideictic Dimensions of Galatians as Formative Rhetoric: The Inscription of Early Christian Community', *Rhetorica* 18.2 (2000), pp. 117-45.

37. Stowers, *Letter Writing*, pp. 107-109.

38. Reid, 'Paul's Conscious Use', pp. 70-72. Terry's dissertation is notable for a similar effort to analyze Paul's argument as a combination of both Greek rhetorical argument and Semitic symmetrical reasoning; see Ralph Bruce Terry, 'An Analysis of Certain Features of Discourse in the New Testament Book of 1 Corinthians', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas at Arlington, 1993; retrieved June 10, 2005 at <http://bible.ovc.edu/terry/dissertation/index.htm>. Cf. *idem*, 'Patterns of Discourse Structure in 1 Corinthians', *Journal of Translation and Textlinguistics* 7.4 (1996), pp. 1-32.

a. *First Example: The Complete Argument of 1 Corinthians 1.10-31*

As noted above, most critics who follow Mitchell's argument concerning the deliberative genre of 1 Corinthians accept that 1.10 functions as the letter's thesis statement, that 1.11-17 is its formal 'statement of facts', and that 1.18–15.57 represents a series of 'proofs'. Witherington makes similar verse divisions but labels 1.10 as the *propositio*, 1.11-17 as the *narratio*, and 1.19–16.12 as the *probatio*. In contrast, I argue that 1.10 serves only as the proposition of the first Complete Argument in the letter (1.10-31). Since v. 10 functions as a *Proposition* in much the same form as ten other similar propositional claims in the letter, it is difficult to justify the argument that it stands as the over-arching thesis for the entire letter. Thus, I agree that 1.10 functions as a propositional claim, but the question is how vv. 11-31 should be construed—as the remainder of a Complete Argument or as the defining aspects of the major partitions in the over-arching structure of a treatise.

According to the *Ad Herennium*, the purpose of the *Reason* is to provide the causal grounds for the proposition. What Mitchell describes as the 'statement of the facts' (*diegesis*) and Witherington describes as the *narratio* can equally function as the Complete Argument's *Reason*. More than just a narrative of what was going on in Corinth, the set of rhetorical questions in v. 13—'Has Christ been divided? Was Paul crucified for you? Or were you baptized in the name of Paul?'—sets up the causal basis of the claim in the proposition that there should be 'no divisions among you'. The *Ad Herennium* maintained that a *Reason* is defective if it is weak, groundless, too general, inadequate to the demands of the subject, less than compelling or merely a restatement of the proposition (2.23.35–2.24.37). It must 'conclusively demonstrate the correctness of the proposition'. Paul's appeal to the unity of Christ is his most significant argument in challenge to the schismatic (σχισμάτα) behavior recounted in the problem that he identifies in this section. If this was but mere narrative, we would not expect it also to contain the primary causal argument in support of the proposition. We would expect proof to come in the next section. If it were a mere statement of the facts, we would not expect a causal reason to be supplied. Yet Paul's most powerful reason to challenge the divisions among the Corinthians is the claim that Christ is not divided.

As a *Proof of the Reason*, at 1.17-25 Paul takes up the common deliberative *topos* of 'Wisdom versus Foolishness'. Though Paul's assumptions concerning what counts as wisdom are unquestionably

shaped by his religious convictions, his use of this *topos* is standard form in offering a proof. The *Ad Herennium* counsels,

We shall be using the topics of Wisdom in our discourse if we compare advantages and disadvantages, counseling the pursuit of the one and the avoidance of the other; if we urge a course in a field in which we have a technical knowledge of the ways and means whereby each detail should be carried out; or if we recommend some policy in a matter whose history we can recall either from direct experience or hear-say—in this instance we can easily persuade our hearers to the course we wish by adducing precedent (3.3.4).

By contrasting wisdom with foolishness, Paul is engaged in reasoning by contraries (*Ad Her.* 4.17.24–18.26), a standard strategy of persuasive argument. At the center of the proof is a citation from the Septuagint of Isa. 29.14. It is the first of fourteen clear instances in this letter where Paul uses a citation from the text of the Septuagint as an authoritative precedent for his argument. The constant juxtaposition of this *topos* throughout this section of the argument helps establish the internal boundaries of the argument.

On the other hand, both Mitchell and Witherington believe that v. 17 belongs to the preceding section. Several rhetorically-demonstrable factors suggest otherwise. First is the argument from the references to wisdom. As the *topos* for this section ‘wisdom’ is initially introduced in v. 17 and re-referenced seven more times through v. 25. It is contrasted with four references to ‘foolishness’. Mere repetition argues for the boundaries of this section. This is bolstered by the parallelism of the argument as suggested in Appendix 1.

Secondly, the natural logic of v. 17 (that is, the repeated ideas of wisdom, proclamation, cross/crucifixion and power) relates to what follows, not to the baptismal stasis argument of vv. 11-16. Rather than a concluding affirmation of a ‘Statement of the Facts’, the claims of v. 17 introduce the ideas that are intrinsic to the *Proof of the Reason*. For example, the reference to the ‘power’ of the ‘cross of Christ’ in v. 17 (segment A) is clearly paralleled with the concept of ‘the power of God’ in v. 24 (segment A’). For Paul, the cross becomes the master metaphor that confounds all conventional wisdom. Because of this, the Christian community must recognize that redemptive wisdom is always counter-intuitive; God’s wisdom will always be foolishness to the debaters. This argument is summarized as a maxim on the reversal of all conventional

wisdom in v. 25.<sup>39</sup> The overt parallels between the ideas introduced in v. 17 and re-introduced in vv. 22-25 mark paralleled dimensions of Paul's reasoning at this point and serve as boundary markers for the beginning and ending of this leg of his argument.

Thirdly, the οὐ γὰρ...ἀλλά formula of v. 17 clearly demarcates the shift from the causal reason to an argument offered as proof of the reason concerning the true problem of the Corinthian division rather than the presenting problem of baptismal pedigrees—as if the social status of the one baptizing confers a social status on the baptizand in congregational disputes. Pogoloff argues that Paul's reference to 'eloquent wisdom' (1.17) translates σοφία λόγου, a phrase that frequently implied a whole world of social status based on access to education and training in civic discourse rather than mere rhetorical skill. It is a phrase that implies the educational station that marks those who are noble versus those who are ignoble. A 'wise' speaker was an individual who spoke in a manner that revealed the person to be educated, cultured, literate, and one whose persuasive discourse was normally considered to be more highly valued. The argument of 1.17 speaks against the behavior of 1.12. Pogoloff contends that at 1.17 Paul shifts the discussion by denying that he preached in a status-conferring manner and begins to respond, 'not to the division itself, but to the values which lie behind it'.<sup>40</sup>

The *Ad Herennium* states: 'Embellishment consists of similes, examples, amplifications, previous judgments, and other means which serve to expand and enrich the argument' (2.28.46). The repetitive nature of Paul's *Embellishment* (vv. 26-29) clearly identifies its role of heightening the argument at this point with *climax* (specifically *gradatio*, *Ad Her.* 4.24.34), expressing a set of politically-charged words underscoring Paul's argument concerning the gospel reversal of class distinction. By way of a step-parallel *antithesis*, Paul contrasts the 'wise', 'strong' and those of 'noble birth' with those whom the world views as 'the foolish', 'the weak' and 'the despised'. These are the same terms employed by Greek writers since the time of Solon to underscore the

39. See R.A. Ramsaran, *Liberating Words: Paul's Use of Rhetorical Maxims in 1 Corinthians 1–10* (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1996), p. 32.

40. Stephen M. Pogoloff, *Logos and Sophia: The Rhetorical Situation of 1 Corinthians* (SBLDS, 134; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992), p. 119.

distinctions of class division in *στάσις*.<sup>41</sup> For example, Aristotle contrasted the oligarchy who were defined by birth (*γένος*), wealth (*πλοῦτος*) and education (*παιδεία*), with the *demos* who are characterized by low birth (*ἀγένεια*), poverty (*πενία*) and vulgarity (*βανανσία*) (*Pol.* 6.1.9 1317b39-41). An oxymoron is added in v. 28 (God chose the ‘things that are not, to reduce to nothing things that are’) to heighten the effect of radically redefining that which counts as ‘noble’. Thus, the Embellishment takes the topos that the cross has reversed conventional wisdom, previously offered in the *Proof of the Reason* section, and applies this counter-intuitive principle to challenge assumptions concerning who should be in leadership and authority in the Corinthian congregation. If the educated ‘debators’ are those who would tend to re-instate the wisdom of the world (a *sophia* that is nothing other than rhetoric), Paul counters that all boasting should be in Jesus Christ who ‘became for us wisdom of God’.<sup>42</sup>

The basis of the agreement called for in the *Proposition* is unambiguously clarified at this point in the *Résumé*. It draws together the themes of the argument as a ‘summing up’ in v. 30 and then concludes in v. 31 with the Appeal to Pity by way of a gnomic maxim (cf. *Ad Her.* 2.29.47), that is, an adapted citation of the Septuagint version of Jer. 9.22-23.<sup>43</sup> Paul cites this maxim again at 2 Cor. 10.17. In summing up the Proposition that the Corinthians must prioritize unity over division, he concludes that unity must be in Christ Jesus who is wisdom (as well as ‘righteousness and sanctification and redemption’) in contrast to a rhetorical view of ‘wisdom’ as a kind of foolishness that foments social division. Both his and their grounds for boasting should lie exclusively ‘in the Lord’.

The text is rhetorically rich in implications, but my purpose here is merely to demonstrate the way in which Paul has made use of the Complete Argument pattern and subordinated his Semitic binary strategy of reasoning through parallelism to this cross-cultural argument structure. The result, though not elegant by Athenian standards, is still rhetorically ‘weighty (*βαρεῖαι*) and strong (*ἰσχυραί*)’. This reading problematizes the partition of this material according to a deliberative

41. L.L. Welborn, *Politics and Rhetoric in the Corinthian Epistles* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1995), p. 21.

42. On this view of *sophia* as rhetoric, see Pogoloff, *Logos and Sophia*, p. 110; and Welborn, *Politics and Rhetoric*, p. 30.

43. Cf. Stanley, *Paul and the Language of Scripture*, pp. 186-88.



*partes orationis*. I am not disputing Mitchell's contention that the issue of unity is uppermost in Paul's mind in the way he organizes his response to the Corinthians. Rather, I am questioning whether one must identify a single controlling intention that structures the whole letter as a treatise in order to bring the resources of the rhetorical tradition to bear in critical analysis. If my argument concerning Paul's use of the Complete Argument strategy of reasoning is accurate at this point, it would provide a middle way through—use of the rhetorical tradition without dependence on genre constraints in assessing the argument(s) of this Pauline letter.

b. *Second Example: Amplification of a Theme in 1 Corinthians 9.1-27*

Early in ch. 9 of 1 Corinthians, Paul states that he is offering his defense to those who would examine him.<sup>44</sup> The goal here, as in ch. 11, is to invent a plausible context in which readers can be encouraged to 'be imitators of me, just as I am of Christ' (μιμηταί μου γίνεσθε καθὼς καὶ γὼ Χριστοῦ, 11.1). Paul rhetorically frames the argument of ch. 9 by offering his efforts as an example to be emulated rather than defended; in other words, this is likely more of a feigned rather than a required *apologia* in the tradition of Isocrates's *Antidosis*. He employs the rhetorical form of an *apologia* to challenge his detractors without having to engage in the kind of counter-attack that would undermine his purpose. The argument as schematized in Appendix 2 does not conform to either the design or the tone of a formal *apologia*. However, it does appear to be a fine example of the Amplification of a Theme—a fine example, that is, as long as one grants Paul the subtlety to have a more sophisticated purpose in view than the defense of his stated theme.

Robbins has already identified this argument as an example of an Amplification of a Theme from the *Ad Herennium* in his extensive and sensitive exploration of the various textures of the argument of 1 Corinthians 9. Citing a proposal by Sisson, he argues for the following partition of the argument:<sup>45</sup>

44. One of the most striking features of this chapter is that 25 of the 27 verses make use of the first- or second-person pronoun and by far the most frequent pronouns are 'I', 'me', 'my' and 'myself'; see Robbins, *Tapestry*, pp. 66-67.

45. Robbins, *Tapestry*, pp. 77-79, citing Russell B. Sisson, 'The Apostle as Athlete: A Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation of 1 Corinthians 9', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University, Atlanta, 1994.

Thesis:	Am I not free	(9.1a)
Rationale:	Apostolicity asserted	(9.1b)
Confirmation of the rationale:		(9.1c-2)
Restatement of the thesis:	This is my defense	(9.3-6)
Argument from analogy:	Argument from ‘the law’	(9.7)
Argument from written testimony (previous judgment):		(9.8-12a)
<i>Introduction</i>		(v. 8)
<i>Rationale</i>		(v. 9)
Embellishment		(v. 10)
Conclusion		(vv. 11-12a)
Argument from the contrary with digression and reasons:		(9.12b-18)
<i>Introduction</i>		(v. 12b)
<i>Repositioning the Argument</i>		(vv. 13-14)
Restatement		(v. 15a)
Rationale		(v. 15b)
Confirmatio		(vv. 16-17)
Conclusion		(v. 18)
Argument from example: What Paul became for the sake of the Gospel:		(9.19-23)
<i>Introduction</i>		(v. 19)
Embellishment		(vv. 20-22)
Conclusion		(v. 23)
Résumé: The manner in which Paul ‘runs the race’ applied to all as example:		(9.24-27)
<i>Introduction</i>		(v. 24a)
<i>Rationale</i>		(v. 24b)
Embellishment		(v. 25)
Conclusion		(vv. 26-27)

The partition of the argument summarized below and presented in detail in Appendix 2 varies very little from the broad structure of Robbins’s analysis. However, in the argument that follows, I lay challenge to his analysis of the strategy of reasoning within each division of this Amplification of a Theme. Where Robbins proposes a new set of linear divisions to analyze each leg of this argument, I propose that the argument is better understood as a further example of Paul’s style of symmetrical reasoning subordinated to the linear logic of the Amplification of a Theme.

Theme stated:	Am I not free	(9.1a)
Reason:	Apostolicity asserted	(9.1b-2)
1		(v. 1b)
2		
1’		(v. 2)
2’		
Theme amplified: Paul’s <i>Apologia</i> —a ‘defense’ with corresponding analogies:		(9.3-7)
A		(vv. 3-4)
B		(v. 5)
B’		(v. 6)
A’		(v. 7)
Argument from authority (testimony): Argument from ‘the law’:		(9.8-12a)
A		(v. 8)
B		(v. 9a)

	C	(v. 9b)
	C'	(v. 10a)
	B'	(v. 10b)
	A'	(vv. 11-12a)
Argument by comparison: Temple Service: (9.12b-18)		
	A	(v. 12b)
	B	(vv. 13-14)
	C	(v. 15)
	B'	(vv. 16-17)
	A'	(v. 18)
Embellishment: Paul's choice to reject all privilege: (9.19-23)		
	A	(v. 19)
	B	(vv. 20-22)
	A'	(v. 23)
Résumé: The manner in which Paul 'runs the race' applied to all as example: (9.24-27)		
	1	(v. 24)
	2	
	1'	(v. 25)
	2'	(v. 26)
	1'	(v. 27)
	2'	

The Theme is stated clearly with a simple interrogative question: 'Am I not free?' Robbins suggests that 9.1b-2 can be broken into two component divisions: A 'Rationale' and the 'Confirmation of the Rationale'. There is no reason to quibble over these designations, but the parallelism within can be missed by the linearity of the Greco-Roman division. The repetition of the phrase 'Am I not an apostle?' (οὐκ εἰμὶ ἀπόστολος;) followed by the argument that the work of Christ among them should be the seal of his apostolic status among them is compositionally developed as a 1, 2, 1', 2' in ways that are immediately evident in the original.

Robbins argues that vv. 3-6 function as a restatement of the thesis and then separates v. 7 as an argument from analogy. Though I do not dispute these rhetorical functions, I suggest that breaking them out in this way obscures the way in which the interrogatives relate symmetrically. Verses 4 and 7 both ask general rhetorical questions, the answers to which are self-evident—'of course people have rights to expect certain things'. These general questions encase a set of specific questions for which the answers should, therefore, be equally self-evident: Paul and Barnabas should be permitted to travel with a spouse and they should have the right to teach without being forced to justify asking for provision. The B and B' questions are specific to Paul and Barnabas, while the bracketing questions in the A and A' segments are more generally self-evident rights. For this reason, the arguments should be grouped together rather than letting the form of the final three questions

separate them from the prior interrogatives. The present construal also does not separate the historically specific interrogatives from the analogically negative interrogatives of v. 7. There is a natural relationship between these questions, though the representation as step parallelism is meant to indicate more the tumbling force of the sustained barrage than a specific parallelism of relationship between the 1's, 2's and 3's.

The contrast between the internal logics in the next three divisions of the Amplification represents the most significant difference between the two proposals. Where the current presentation organizes the arguments as examples of symmetrical reasoning, Robbins partitions each division of the Amplification of the Theme with the logic of a Complete Argument. Hence the Argument from Authority (testimony) is subdivided by an introduction, a rationale, an embellishment, and a conclusion. His proposal for an Argument from the Contrary (my Argument from Comparison) is more convoluted, departing from the typical handbook partitioning language; for example, '*repositioning the argument*'; and so on. His Argument from Example (my Argument by Embellishment) is also subdivided by an introduction, central embellishment, and conclusion.

In the Argument from Authority at 9.8-12, the sense that Paul is reasoning by symmetry becomes even more apparent. He begins from an assumed rightful claim to reap material benefit from shared participation, arguing that the 'law' affirms the principle (A). He cites the portion of the law from Deut. 25.4 (B). He interprets the law of the plowing oxen as a maxim applicable to all honest workers (C-C'). He then refers back to what was written to derive a principle of hope for all honest workers (B'). He concludes with a very specific assessment of the rightful claim he and Barnabas could have made to be recompensed for their work among the Corinthians (A'). Obviously it is natural for an initial thesis and a concluding summary to function as seeming parallels. What is different here is the overt parallelism between the citation of an authoritative text in v. 9a and the interpretive return to that text in v. 10b. It is more interpretively useful to note the involutive nature of this reasoning than to suggest that the citation of the text from Deuteronomy functions as a rationale and the interpretation of it functions as an embellishment. If one were to turn to the tradition of divisional logic the citation of a text is more an embellishment than a rationale, and an interpretation is more a rationale than an embellishment.

In the Argument by Comparison in vv. 12b-18, the phrase ‘made use of this right’ in v. 12b is virtually repeated in ‘make full use of my rights’ in v. 18. The phrase appears again in the center of the symmetrically reasoned argument at v. 15. The comparison between those employed in temple service participating in the benefits of that system are applied to those who proclaim the gospel by direct comparison.<sup>46</sup> Note the repetition of the concepts of ‘proclaim the gospel’ in v. 14 (B) and in v. 16 (B’). Though one can certainly reframe this argument into a kind of syllogistic logic with a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion, in doing so the central assertion of the chiasmic logic is lost. Robbins summarizes the argument thus:<sup>47</sup>

*Major premise:* Preaching the gospel of one’s own free will brings a reward, but preaching the gospel not of one’s own free will makes it (only) an entrustment with a commission.

*Minor premise:* Preaching the gospel is laid upon Paul as a necessity, an entrustment of a commission.

*Conclusion:* Therefore, preaching the gospel as an entrustment gives Paul no ground for boasting (but preaching it of his own free will brings reward).

But this analysis must then be supplemented with a second syllogism:

*Unstated major premise:* My ground for boasting is doing this of my own free will.

*Minor premise:* I would rather die than have anyone deprive me of my ground of boasting (i.e. doing this of my own free will).

*Conclusion:* Therefore, I have made no use of these rights, nor am I writing to secure any such provision (a decision of my own will).

Alternatively, symmetrical analysis provides the reader an ability to sort through Paul’s reasoning by the way it prioritizes that which matters most to Paul. Verse 15 is the heart of the argument (that he has not sought to make use of his rights), with the central point of turning the assertion that he would rather die than that he would use writing to impose his rights. Where Robbins has to resort to ‘repositioning...

46. Robbins, *Tapestry*, pp. 84-85, argues that Paul is repositioning his argument by analogy, but this is a comparison between two kinds of service to God—one kind in the Temple, the other kind in proclamation of the gospel. This is a comparison rather than an analogy.

47. Robbins, *Tapestry*, p. 85.



restatement... rationale... confirmation... [and]...conclusion' to sort the argument, the symmetrical analysis permits contemporary readers to see the relationships between repeated ideas set both in comparison and in contrast while clearly establishing the heart of the matter.

There is less difference between symmetrical construal and Robbins's divisional analysis of the argument in 9.19-23. Robbins offers the same three divisions as those found in Appendix 2, but names them with the linear categories of the handbook tradition. He considers vv. 20-22 an embellishment with bookends wrapped around it of an introduction and a conclusion. Since a conclusion reiterates (parallels) the ideas of the introduction, I agree with this assessment, but choose to name the whole division as an embellishment rather than an argument from example. Where analysis of symmetrical reasoning provides greater clarification is in detailing the rhythm of the step-parallelism.

The *Ad Herennium* states: 'Conclusions, among the Greeks called *epilogoï*, are tripartite, consisting of the Summing Up, Amplification, and Appeal to Pity' (2.31.50). They restate the proposition, summarize the essential argument(s), and conclude with an emotive appeal to affirm or give assent to the argument. Embellishments are not typically common to conclusions. Robbins finds a fourfold division where I find only two divisions: an appeal to pity followed by a summing up. He begins by introducing the central metaphor of a race and then appeals to the Corinthians to 'run in such a way that you may win it' (v. 24b). Since Paul's primary argument has been an assertion of his own freedom in the form of a coy *apologia*, he makes no direct appeal to accept the case he has made. To have done so would have been to cede the legitimacy of the challenge that occasioned the *apologia*. Instead, Paul chooses to make a final appeal to call the Corinthian disciples to do no less than he, run the race to win the imperishable crown. As such, he concludes the argument on the offensive, offering his ministry rather than the argument of his detractors as the model that legitimates his apostolicity.

Careful analysis of the textual symmetries indicated in Appendix 2 suggests a more compelling argument than that offered by Robbins in construing the inner-texture of the logic of the reasoning of the divisions of the Amplified Theme in 1 Corinthians 9.<sup>48</sup> This is not to say that Paul

48. Robbins brings a brilliant tapestry of methodologies to his analysis of biblical texts in *Tapestry*. Unfortunately, he does not explore the ancient conception of extended chiasmus or symmetrical reasoning in his proposal for a socio-rhetorical

only makes use of what has been distinguished here as more of a Semitic reasoning style in his development of an argument.<sup>49</sup> For example, notice his control of the rhetorical figures in the Restatement of the Theme. In this portion of the argument he amplifies the direct question stated at the outset in 9.1 by asking a series of questions in order to reproach or upbraid those who would deny his rights. Cicero declares this technique to be most effective in stirring the emotions of the recipients, and advises that rhetorical questions can be used with great effectiveness if the answer is increasingly obvious and a formal conclusion or a response is not required (*Part. or.* 13.47). Paul's seconding of these questions with the rhetorical questions in v. 7 has the effect of making the first set of questions appear patently frivolous and those who would ask such questions arrogant.

There are many other tropes and schemes employed that would have been familiar to those schooled in the ancient handbook tradition, but the clear and over-riding presence of reasoning by symmetry has been established as the compositional strategy of thought within each of the divisions of the more linear logic of an Amplification of a Theme. In making argument in 1 Corinthians, Paul consistently subordinates this more Semitic style of symmetrical reasoning to the discipline of the Greek strategy of effective persuasive organization by Amplification of a Theme. Identifying the parallels not only enables the reader to clarify the essential nature of the argument, but it also serves to denote the boundaries of each one of the arguments that make up the divisions within the thematic amplification.

analysis, preferring the 'polysemic conception of chiasmus' of the new historicists, p. 212. He proposes four principles of socio-rhetorical criticism that he construes chiasmically.

49. In antiquity, aspects of this form of reasoning by way of parallelism were often referred to as Asianist rhetoric. Dionysius of Halicarnassus had little patience for this over-obvious 'balancing' of clauses and periods that gave the impression of *sunthesis* being 'chiseled to perfection'. In Attic practice, he considered it 'juvenile' (*Isoc.* 12), while in contemporary Asianist practice, he considered it 'degenerate humbug' (*Rhet.* 4). See Robert Stephen Reid, 'Dionysius of Halicarnassus: Theory of Compositional Style and the Theory of Literate Consciousness', *Rhetoric Review* 15 (1996), pp. 46-64.

### 3. Conclusion

Notwithstanding his coy argument to the contrary in 1 Cor. 2.4, this inquiry has offered continuing support for my claim that in composing the argument of 1 Corinthians Paul made *conscious* and extensive use of the patterned strategies of argument documented in the *Ad Herennium*.<sup>50</sup> If Paul was to challenge the arguments of adversaries who were well-schooled in rhetorical theory, we should not be surprised that he would be forced to conduct his argument according to the forms of reasoning his constituency had already found compelling in the rhetoric of his opponents. As noted, this was the testimony of his adversaries (2 Cor. 10.9-10).

The argument does not assume that Paul structured the entire letter according to the deliberative genre of the *partes orationis*. A good speech must exercise this kind of control, but not a good letter. Critics can look to the rhetorical tradition for evidence of what Paul's readers would have counted as 'plausible argument' without the necessity of forcing the whole of an epistolary argument to be read through the grid of rhetoric's three classic genres. Aristotle's interest in differentiating the need for audiences to render a verdict concerning the just and unjust, to act with regard to the expedient versus the inexpedient, or make a determination between the honorable and dishonorable (*Rhet.* 1.3.1-4 1358b) were abstractions rather than practical distinctions derived from real oratory. Mitchell's claim that 1.10 functions as a deliberative *prothesis* controlling a sustained argument for unity over division in all the argument of 1 Corinthians is not supported by this reading. A powerful argument can be made that this is a recurrent theme placed at the outset of the letter to frame much of what Paul will say, but this is different than claiming that all arguments within the letter must be filtered through the 'glasses' of the claim made at 1.10.

The fact that Paul appears to consistently subordinate traditional concrete, paratactical, and involutive structures of Semitic reasoning strategies to the more abstract, syntactical, and linear strategies of *ratiocination* found in the cross-cultural rhetoric of the *Ad Herennium* is also significant. Too often, critics begin with the assumption that rhetorical reasoning in antiquity was either involutive or linear and then

50. Reid, 'Paul's Conscious Use', p. 65.

dismiss or, worse, ignore the findings of other colleagues who arrive at conclusions by way of a different set of assumptions. This study challenges this contemporary bifurcation of scholarly ‘camps’ in ways that offer a suggestive line of inquiry into the manner in which writers like Paul straddled the task of making argument in a bi-cultural context.<sup>51</sup> Robbins’s argument that Paul made use of the *Ad Herennium*’s argument tradition would be stronger if it was not forced to treat each leg of an argument as if the argument within must be structured by the same logic as the logic of the whole. To the degree that Paul’s letters represent perhaps our most important artifacts of cross-cultural argumentation from this era, it is important to observe how he negotiates these two disparate forms of reasoning in his effort to persuade his readers.

This inquiry also challenges the neglected role of the *Ad Herennium*’s persuasive strategies rather than logical strategies of reasoning as reflected in the practice of cross-cultural *persuasive* discourse in antiquity. The evidence adduced by analysis and demonstration in the present argument suggests that Paul was acutely aware of the forms of both forensic and deliberative *argumentatio* represented in this rhetorical tradition. Though one may not be able to argue for the direct influence of this Latin handbook, Paul’s use of its argument structures to frame his own appeals clearly demonstrates the influence of the tradition it sought to synthesize. Thus, it can be stated unequivocally that Paul made *conscious* use of this particular tradition of rhetorical theory in his effort to invent ‘plausible arguments’ in 1 Corinthians.

#### Appendix 1: Argument Design in 1 Corinthians 1.10-31

<p><b>PROPOSITION: An Appeal for Unity</b>          (10) <b>A</b> Now I appeal to you, brothers and sisters,          by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ,              <b>B</b> that all of you be in agreement              <b>B'</b> and that there be no divisions (σχίσματα) among you,  <b>A'</b> but that you be united in the same mind and the same          purpose.</p>	<p>Basis of Unity           Agreement          No divisions          Essential unity</p>
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51. Yeo offers a preliminary review of the literature on this issue and argues that Judaic and Hellenistic rhetoric must be viewed as a more interactive phenomenon in antiquity; see Khiok-khng Yeo, *Rhetorical Interaction in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10: A Formal Analysis with Preliminary Suggestions for a Chinese Cross-Cultural Hermeneutic* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), pp. 63-67.

<p><b>REASON: A Problem of Stasis Boasting</b></p> <p>(11) <b>A</b> For it has been reported to me by Chloe's people that there are quarrels among you, my brothers and sisters.</p> <p>(12) <b>B</b> What I mean is that each of you says, "I belong to Paul," or "I belong to Apollos," or "I belong to Cephas," or "I belong to Christ."</p> <p>(13) <b>B'</b> Has Christ been divided? Was Paul crucified for you? Or were you baptized in the name of Paul?</p> <p>(14) <b>A'</b> I thank God that I baptized none of you except Crispus and Gaius,</p> <p>(15) so that no one can say that you were baptized in my name.</p> <p>(16) (I did baptize also the household of Stephanas; beyond that, I do not know whether I baptized anyone else.)</p>	<p>Specific person</p> <p>Divisive affiliations arise</p> <p>Division challenged</p> <p>Specific persons</p>
<p><b>PROOF OF THE REASON:</b>  <b>Topos–Wisdom versus Foolishness</b></p> <p>(17) <b>A</b> For Christ did not send me to baptize but to proclaim the gospel, and not with eloquent wisdom, so that the cross of Christ might not be emptied of its power.</p> <p>(18) <b>B</b> For the message about the cross is foolishness to those who are perishing, but to us who are being saved it is the power of God.</p> <p>(19) <b>C</b> For it is written, "I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and the discernment of the discerning I will thwart."</p> <p>(20) Where is the one who is wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the debater of this age?  <b>C'</b> Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world?</p> <p>(21) <b>B'</b> For since, in the wisdom of God, the world did not know God through wisdom, God decided, through the foolishness of our proclamation, to save those who believe.</p> <p>(22) <b>A 1</b> For Jews demand signs and Greeks desire wisdom,</p> <p>(23) <b>2</b> but we proclaim Christ crucified, a stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles,</p> <p>(24) <b>1'</b> but to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God.</p> <p>(25) <b>2'</b> For God's foolishness is wiser than human wisdom, and God's weakness is stronger than human strength.</p>	<p>Proclaim gospel that would empty the cross of power</p> <p>Cross is foolishness</p> <p>Cross is power of God (Isa. 29:14)</p> <p>Destroy wisdom of the world as foolish</p> <p>Wisdom is foolish since God decides</p> <p>Not wisdom since God decides it is foolishness</p> <p>Foolish wisdom</p> <p>Proclaim gospel</p> <p>which is Foolishness</p> <p>and the Power of God</p> <p>Foolishness is wise</p> <p>Power is strength</p>
<p><b>EMBELLISHMENT: Antithesis by way of Gradatio to create Climax.</b></p> <p>(26) Consider your own call, brothers and sisters:  <b>1</b> not many of you were wise by human standards,  <b>2</b> not many were powerful,  <b>3</b> not many were of noble birth.</p> <p>(27) <b>1'</b> But God chose what is foolish in the world to shame the wise;  <b>2'</b> God chose what is weak in the world to shame the strong;</p> <p>(28) <b>3'</b> God chose what is low and despised in the world— things that are not, to reduce to nothing things that are—</p> <p>(29) so that no one <b>might boast</b> in the presence of God.</p>	<p>The Wise</p> <p>The Strong</p> <p>The Noble</p> <p>The Wise</p> <p>The Strong</p> <p>The Noble</p> <p>Boasting?</p>



<p><b>RÉSUMÉ: The Alternative to Factional Stasis</b>          (30) <b>He</b> is the source of your life in <b>Christ Jesus</b>,          who became for us <b>wisdom</b> from <b>God</b>,          and righteousness and sanctification and redemption,          (31) in order that, as it is written,          "Let the one who <b>boasts, boast</b> in the Lord."</p>	<p>Summing up           Appeal to pity:          a gnomic maxim          (Jer. 9.22-23 LXX)</p>
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Appendix 2: Argument Design in 1 Corinthians 9.1-27

<p><b>THEME STATED: The legitimacy of Paul's ministry (9:1a)</b>          (9.1) Am I not free?</p>	<p>Paul's legitimacy</p>
<p><b>REASON: Apostolicity asserted (9.1b-2)</b>          (1b) <b>1 Am I not an apostle?</b>          Have I not seen Jesus our Lord?              <b>2</b> Are <b>you</b> not my work in the Lord?          (2) <b>1' If I am not an apostle</b> to others,          at least I am to you;              <b>2' for you</b> are the seal of my apostleship in the Lord.</p>	<p>Am I not an apostle?           Apostolic seal           Am I not an apostle?</p>
<p><b>THEME AMPLIFIED: Paul's Apologia (3-7)</b>          (3) This is my defense to those who would examine me.          (4) <b>A</b> Do we not have the right to our food and drink?          (5) <b>B</b> Do we not have the right to be accompanied          by a believing wife, as do the other apostles          and the brothers of the Lord and Cephas?          (6) <b>B'</b> Or is it only Barnabas and I who have no right          to refrain from working for a living?          (7) <b>A'</b> Who at any time pays the expenses          for doing military service?          Who plants a vineyard and does not eat any of its fruit?          Or who tends a flock and does not get any of its milk?</p>	<p>Apostolic seal          Apologia          Question of Participation           Question of Participation           Question of Participation</p>
<p><b>ARGUMENT FROM AUTHORITY: Argument from "the law" (8-12a)</b>          (8) <b>A</b> Do I say this on human authority?          Does not the law also say the same?          (9) <b>B</b> For it is written in the law of Moses,          "You shall not muzzle an ox          while it is treading out the grain."              <b>C</b> Is it for oxen that God is concerned?          (10) <b>C'</b> Or does he not speak entirely for our sake?              <b>B' 1</b> It was indeed written for our sake,          for whoever plows              <b>2</b> should plow in hope              <b>1'</b> and whoever threshes              <b>2</b> should thresh in hope of a share in the crop.          (11) <b>A'</b> If we have sown spiritual good among you,          is it too much if we reap your material benefits?          (12) If others share this rightful claim on you,          do not we still more?</p>	<p>Questions of Participation          Rightful claim?          What is written in the law           Dialogical question          Dialogical question          Interpretation          Whoever plows plows in hope          Whoever threshes threshes in hope           Rightful claim</p>

<p><b>ARGUMENT BY COMPARISON: Temple Service (12b-18)</b></p> <p>A Nevertheless, we have <b>not made use of this right</b>, but we endure anything rather than put an obstacle in the way of the gospel of Christ.</p> <p>(13) <b>B 1</b> Do you not know that those who are employed in the temple service  <b>2</b> get their food from the temple,  <b>1</b> and those who serve at the altar  <b>2</b> share in what is sacrificed on the altar?</p> <p>(14) <b>1</b> In the same way, the Lord commanded that those who <b>proclaim the gospel</b>  <b>2</b> should get their living by the gospel.</p> <p>(15) <b>C a</b> But I have made no use of any of these rights,  <b>b</b> nor am I writing this  so that they may be applied in my case.  <b>b'</b> Indeed, I would rather die than that—  <b>a'</b> no one will deprive me  of my ground for boasting!</p> <p>(16) <b>B' 1</b> If I proclaim the gospel,  this gives me no ground for boasting,  <b>2</b> for an obligation is laid on me, and woe to me  if I do not proclaim the gospel!</p> <p>(17) <b>1'</b> For if I do this of my own will,  I have a reward;  <b>2'</b> but if not of my own will,  I am entrusted with a commission.</p> <p>(18) <b>A'</b> What then is my reward? Just this:  that in my proclamation I may make  the gospel free of charge, so as not to  make full use of my rights in the gospel.</p>	<p>No use of right</p> <p>Comparison  Example from service in the temple religion</p> <p>Proclaim gospel  extrapolated to Christian service</p> <p>No use of right</p> <p>Ground for boast  Proclaim gospel  Occasion to boast  Occasion to serve  Proclaim gospel  My own will  I have reward  My own will  I have commission</p> <p>Proclamation of the gospel</p> <p>No use of right</p>
<p><b>EMBELLISHMENT: Paul's choice to reject all privilege (19-23)</b></p> <p>(19) <b>A 1</b> For though I am free with respect to all,  I have made myself a slave to all,  <b>2</b> so that I might win more of them.</p> <p>(20) <b>B 1</b> I became to the Jews as a Jew,  <b>2</b> in order to win Jews.  <b>1</b> To those under the law I became as one under the law  (though I myself am not under the law)  <b>2</b> so that I might win those under the law.</p> <p>(21) <b>1</b> To those outside the law  I became as one outside the law  (though I am not free from God's law  but am under Christ's law)  <b>2</b> so that I might win those outside the law.</p> <p>(22) <b>1</b> To the weak, I became weak  <b>2</b> so that I might win the weak.  <b>1</b> [T]o all people I have become all things,  <b>2</b> that I might by all means save some.</p> <p>(23) <b>A' 1'</b> [F]or the sake of the gospel, I do it all  <b>2'</b> so that I may share in its blessings.</p>	<p>Though free to all  I became a slave  to win others</p> <p>I became as a Jew  to win Jews</p> <p>I became observer  to win observers</p> <p>I became lawless</p> <p>to win the lawless  I became weak  to win the weak  I have become all  to win all  I do all  to share with all</p>

<p><b>RÉSUMÉ: The manner in which Paul “runs the race” (24-27)</b></p> <p>(24) <b>[APPEAL TO PITY]</b></p> <p>    <b>1</b> Do you not know that in a race the runners all compete,              but only one receives the prize?</p> <p>    <b>2</b> Run in such a way that you may win it.</p> <p><b>[SUMMING UP PERSONAL FREEDOM BY ANALOGY]</b></p> <p>(25) <b>1’</b> Athletes exercise self-control in all things;              they do it to receive a perishable wreath,              but we an imperishable one.</p> <p>(26) <b>2</b> So I do not run aimlessly,              nor do I box as though beating the air;</p> <p>(27) <b>1’</b> but I punish my body and enslave it,              <b>2’</b> so that after proclaiming to others              I myself should not be disqualified.</p>	<p>Reward</p> <p>Run to win</p> <p>Athlete          Example          Perishable reward          Imperishable reward          Run with aim          Bodily training averts          disqualification</p>
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