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PAUL'S SPEECH IN ACTS 26 AND SOCRATES'S SPEECH IN PLATO'S *APOLOGY*: BEYOND FORENSIC ORATORY

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Introduction

In the book of Acts, a variety of speeches appear throughout the book. Scholars who define the genre of Acts as ancient historiography have also noted the nature of those speeches in Acts that contain Greco-Roman rhetoric, in which such rhetorical display is an essential literary feature of ancient historiography, revealing the author's aim and purpose. Among the speeches in Acts, some scholars have focused on a series of Paul's discourses in Acts 22–26 and proposed that they take the form of forensic defense speech used in Greek and Roman courtrooms.

In this paper, I explore Paul's speech before King Agrippa and Festus in Acts 26 in light of forensic defense oratory. In particular, by comparing and contrasting it with Plato's *Apology of Socrates* and finding some possible echoes from the *Apology* in Paul's speech, I investigate the rhetorical and literary strategies that the speakers and authors used in these works to achieve their respective purposes.

Preliminaries: Acts 22–26 as Series of Forensic Defense Speeches

Although ancient rhetorical perspectives in Acts have been a subject of interest among biblical scholars, Jerome Neyrey was the first to have defined Paul's speeches in Acts 22–26 as forensic defense speeches, crafted accord-

ing to structures found in ancient rhetorical handbooks.[1] He initially divided Paul's speeches into *exordium*, *narratio* and *probatio* (excluding the *reputatio* and *peroratio* sections) based on their content, noting that these sections correspond to different parts of forensic defense speeches.[2] Twelve years later, Neyrey, with Bruce Malina, dealt with this subject in more detail in their monograph *Portraits of Paul*, focusing especially on the ethos of Paul's speeches.[3] Neyrey paid particular attention to the *exordia* of Paul's two speeches in Acts 22 and 24, noting that they contain the ethos of a defendant in that they present Paul as a favorable character. By demonstrating Paul's 'education, piety, and authorization', Luke intends to portray Paul as an 'upright, stable, and pious man, whose testimony deserves a fair hearing in court'.[4]

Neyrey's definition of Acts 22–26 as a forensic defense has allowed scholars to analyze these passages based on their literary form. However, while Neyrey divides each speech in Acts 22, 24 and 26 into sections, providing a chart for the speeches, he explains their meaning as if they were

1. Jerome Neyrey, 'The Forensic Defense Speech and Paul's Trial Speeches in Acts 22–26', in Charles H. Talbert (ed.), *Luke–Acts: New Perspectives from the Society of Biblical Literature Seminar* (New York: Crossroad, 1984), pp. 210-24. Quite recently, Marion L. Soards and Janusz Kucicki in their monographs have closely examined the speeches in Acts. However, they primarily focus on exegetical and literary analyses and do not define Acts 22–26 as forensic defense speeches. According to Aristotle's classification of rhetorical genres in his handbook, orations are divided into three categories: deliberative, epideictic and forensic ('Further, to each of these a special time is appropriate: to the deliberative the future, for the speaker, whether he exhorts or dissuades, always advises about things to come; to the forensic the past, for it is always in reference to things done that one party accuses and the other defends; to the epideictic most appropriately the present, for it is the existing condition of things that all those who praise or blame have in view' [*Rhet*. 1358b8-13; Freese, LCL]).

2. Neyrey, 'Forensic Defense Speech', p. 221.

3. Bruce J. Malina and Jerome H. Neyrey, *Portraits of Paul: An Archaeology of Ancient Personality* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), pp. 77-91. Malina and Neyrey say, 'Luke himself adopted the form of the forensic defense speech, focusing on certain parts and omitting others. In particular, Luke's exordium contains an elaborate presentation of Paul's ethos at the very beginning of the two speeches' (81).

4. Malina and Neyrey, *Portraits of Paul*, p. 82.

one speech. In my opinion, however, although the speeches throughout Acts 22–26 commonly exhibit the characteristics of a forensic defense speech, Luke's aim and purpose in these speeches vary. For example, even though Paul introduces the story of the encounter with Jesus both in Acts 22 and in Acts 26, this story functions differently in the two speeches.

Furthermore, while Neyrey concludes that the subject of Paul's defense throughout Acts 22–26 was the resurrection, a closer look at the text throws this inference into question. In Acts 22, it appears that Paul did not precisely know why the Jews stoned him, although he knew their hostility toward him (cf. 14.19). The primary aim of his speech seems to be to escape death. The main subject of his defense here is not specifically the resurrection but rather his past experience with Jesus and his commissioning to defend himself. After experiencing failure to persuade enraged Jews, Paul chooses a strategy of division by identifying himself before the Sanhedrin as one of the Pharisees who believe in the resurrection (Acts 23.6), prompting some of the Jews to advocate for him. When following the flow of events in Acts 22–26 and Paul's handling of the risks he faces, the reader can readily perceive this underlying motive. Paul makes the issue of the resurrection the focus of the hearings and the subject of his defense in view of a dispute that arose between the Sadducees and Pharisees on the resurrection and the conflict between them (Acts 23.7-9).

Ever since Neyrey's proposal that these speeches constitute a forensic defense, several scholars have taken their judicial form as a matter of presumption. By comparing them with papyri of official legal proceedings in the first and second centuries, Bruce Winter argues that Acts 24 and 26 show similarities with ancient court documents and concludes that Paul's speeches in these chapters can be regarded as summaries of legal speeches in court.[5] In his PhD dissertation in 2006, Derek Hogan deals with forensic speeches in Acts 22–26, focusing primarily on their rhetorical structure and function. Based on his examination of forensic speeches—both prosecutorial and defense speeches—in Greco-Roman novels and historiography, he

5. Bruce Winter, 'Official Proceedings and the Forensic Speeches in Acts 24–26', in Bruce Winter and Andrew D. Clarke (eds.), *The Book of Acts in its First Century Setting: Volume 1. Ancient Literary Setting* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), pp. 305-36.

suggests an adjusted rhetorical structure for Paul's speeches and briefly discusses their functions.[6]

Foregoing scholarly analyses of Paul's speeches in Acts 22–26 that focus on their judicial form have mainly stressed their rhetorical structures according to the ancient rhetorical handbooks, namely, those by Quintilian and Cicero. However, scholars are divided on how to categorize the different parts of Paul's speeches. Instead of focusing on their structural divisions, I investigate some of Paul's rhetorical strategies in his forensic defense speech (Acts 26). My contention is that Plato's *Apology* sheds light on understanding Luke's strategies and devices in Paul's speech.

Plato's Apology of Socrates *and Luke–Acts*

Several studies have examined the links between Plato's *Apology* and the book of Acts. These studies mainly compare the portrayal of Socrates and that of the apostles (mostly Paul). Loveday Alexander argues that the Socratic paradigm—illustrated by Plato, Xenophon, Seneca, Epictetus, Diogenes, etc.—closely resembles the portrayal of the apostles, primarily of Paul, throughout the book of Acts.[7] Ruben Dupertuis and Karl Sandnes mainly focus on Paul's Areopagus speech in Acts 17 and argue that the author of Acts intentionally portrayed Paul as a Socratic figure based on Socratic traditions.[8] Recently, discussing the apparent similarities between Paul's speech in Acts 17 and Socrates's speech in his trial in Plato's *Euthyphro* and *Apology*, Andrew Cowan has argued that the author of Acts

6. Derek K. Hogan, 'Forensic Speeches in Acts 22–26 in their Literary Environment: A Rhetorical Study' (PhD diss., Baylor University, 2006). In addition to these scholars, several commentators have suggested that Acts 24–26 exhibit a structure that resembles the rhetorical form of forensic speech.

7. Loveday C.A. Alexander, 'Acts and Ancient Intellectual Biography', in Bruce Winter and Andrew D. Clarke (eds.), *The Book of Acts in its First Century Setting: Volume 1. Ancient Literary Setting* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), pp. 31-63, who identifies eight similarities: the divine call, the mission, the daimonion, tribulations, persecution, trial, prison, and death.

8. Rubén R. Dupertuis, 'Socratizing Paul: The Portrait of Paul in Acts', *The Fourth R* 22 (2009), pp. 11-18, 28; Karl Olav Sandnes, 'Paul and Socrates: The Aim of Paul's Areopagus Speech', *JSNT* 50 (1993), pp. 13-26.

specifically aimed to allude to Socrates's philosophy of the divine in Paul's speech.[9]

Michael Kochenash strengthens the probability that Luke was portraying Paul as a Socratic figure throughout the book of Acts, claiming that understanding the characterization of Julius in Acts 27 almost requires a Socratic intention given the portrayal of Paul in Acts 17–26 and 28.[10] Interestingly, Matthias Becker also finds Socratic reminiscence in the portrayal of Peter in Acts, albeit in a more general sense. Becker maintains that the general image of Peter in Acts reflects the 'reception of Socrates' in Luke's time, according to him, 80–100 CE.[11] Taking a broader scope, throughout Luke–Acts, Steve Reece finds echoes of Plato's *Apology* throughout Luke–Acts, specifically in the portrayal of Jesus, Peter, other apostles (esp. in Acts 4 and 5) and the apostle Paul, and he argues that Luke uses Plato's *Apology* as a narrative background for his writing.[12]

Besides finding links between Socrates and Paul (as well as between Socrates and the first apostles), scholars have also shown that we can assume Luke had a general knowledge of Greek literature. This inference finds strong support in Acts 26, which relates to Paul's defense before King Agrippa. In v. 14, Jesus is recorded as saying to Paul, 'It is hard for you to kick against the goads,' a sentence that does not occur in Acts 22, in which he also relates his conversion, albeit to a different audience, or in Acts 9, where Luke records his conversion. In line with several other commentators, Craig Keener sees that Paul's use of the Greek proverb and the specific use of the verb λακτίζω would have been closely connected with Euripides's work (*Bacch*. 794-795) and concludes that it is probable that Luke kept the story in mind and echoed it in his writing through the use of specific vocab-

9. J. Andrew Cowan, 'Paul and Socrates in Dialogue: Points of Contact between the Areopagus Speech and the Apology', *NTS* 67 (2022), pp. 121-33.

10. Michael Kochenash, 'Reframing Julius' Kindness (Acts 27) as an Extension of Luke's Socratic Characterization of Paul', *NTS* 67 (2021), pp. 73-84.

11. Matthias Becker, 'Petrus Socraticus? Socratic Reminiscence in Luke's Portrait of the Apostle Peter', *Philologia Classica* 15 (2020), pp. 54-71. Becker lists the similarities as 'the humble origins of Peter, his non-academic profession, his poverty, his lack of formal education, and his unbreakable commitment to obey God and spread the Christian message despite the threat of judges' (51).

12. Steve Reece, 'Echoes of Plato's *Apology of Socrates* in Luke–Acts', *NovT* (2020), pp. 1-21.

ulary.[13] According to Keener, considering the context of Euripides's work, using the proverb here was likely intended to show the 'futility for a human to strive against fate or the will of the deity'.[14] Indeed, Euripides's *Bacchae* is a story of Dionysus, a god who comes to his mother's city in disguise as a mortal human, and Luke might have echoed the text subtly acknowledging the story.

Plato's Apology *and Acts 26*

In terms of its literary form, Paul's speech in Acts 26 does not form an exact parallel with forensic defense oratories written for the defense of the authors themselves or other persons in court, as the former is intertwined with the historical and literary context of Luke–Acts, being situated in Luke's narrative. Notably, however, it is similar in its literary form to Plato's *Apology*, which recounts Socrates's speeches after his death. Considering that contemporary Attic forensic speeches, both for prosecution and for defense, were usually composed to be delivered at an actual law court, Plato's *Apology* can be regarded as a quasi-forensic speech.

Regarding this kind of literary form, a speech rewritten by other than an actual speaker, A.E. Taylor writes that 'Plato has preserved the actual speech of Socrates … [but] the published speech is supposed to have been "revised" in accord with the canons of prose-writing … [However], we clearly have no right to assume that the process of revision and polishing involves any falsification of fundamental facts.'[15] Agreeing with the apologetic nature of the *Apology*, Gabriel Danzig simultaneously argues that the

13. Craig S. Keener, *Acts: An Exegetical Commentary* (4 vols.; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2012–2015), IV, p. 3514, states that Luke's use of another *hapax legomenon* in the New Testament (θεομάχος [Acts 5.39]) increases the possibility of Luke's knowledge of Euripides's work—in Euripides, *Bacch*. 794-795, Dionysus says to Pentheus, 'I would sacrifice to the god rather than kick against his spurs in anger, a mortal against god.'

14. Keener, *Acts*, IV, pp. 3514-15.

15. A.E. Taylor, *Plato: The Men and the Work* (Routledge Library Editions: Plato, 18; Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p. 156.

Apology faithfully reflects the thoughts and character of the historical Socrates, even though it was written after his trial.[16]

According to the above scholars, Plato's *Apology* was thus intended to depict a historical figure and event but also to deliver the author's particular message. Confirming the genre of the *Apology* as 'criminal defense speech', Tennant concludes that Plato utilizes many rhetorical exercises to justify Socrates's way of life.[17] Malcom Schofield also maintains that

> it is obvious that even if Plato accurately reproduces the main topics covered in their original order, the detailed development each receives, and its concrete literary and argumentative texture will have been at least as much Platonic as Socratic, … [and] in some sense a crystallization of Platonic reflection on Socrates, not simply Socrates' self-characterization.[18]

Knut Ågotnes compares Plato's *Apology* with Xenophon's work and points out that, while Xenophon focuses more on the Athenians' unjust condemnation of Socrates, Plato intended mainly to give an example to his audience of 'how to do philosophy'.[19] It demonstrates that although Plato and Xenophon are intent on adhering closely to the truth in their portrayal of

16. Gabriel Danzig, 'Apologizing for Socrates: Plato and Xenophon on Socrates' Behavior in Court', *TAPA* 133 (2003), pp. 281-321 (esp. 281, 283); Anton-Hermann Chroust, 'Socrates—A Source Problem', *New Scholasticism* 19 (1945), pp. 48-72. Chroust says, 'his [Plato's] early dialogues express the highest possible view of Socrates' personality and thought—the maximum potentialities of Socrates' (pp. 52-53).

17. John Roger Tennant, 'Plato's *Apology* as Forensic Oratory', *Archai* 14 (2014), pp. 39-50 (40). Tennant argues that the *Apology* demonstrates 'faithful representation of what Socrates in fact said during his trial' and simultaneously reflects 'Plato's own philosophic views and literary virtuosity' (p. 41); Charles H. Khan, *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Khan argues that the *Apology* 'belongs to a traditional genre, the courtroom speech revised for publication' (p. 88).

18. Malcom Schofield, *Plato: Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 21.

19. Knut Ågotnes, 'Plato's Socrates in the *Apology*: Speaking in Two Voices', in Vivil Valvik Haraldsen, Olof Pettersson and Oda E. Wiese Tvedt (eds.), *Readings of Plato's Apology of Socrates: Defending the Philosophical Life* (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2018), pp. 71-88 (71).

Socrates, their aims and perspectives differ. Plato's *Apology* is more of a historical forensic defense speech by Socrates, and simultaneously, it is one in which Plato tries to achieve his philosophical goals.[20]

It is the same for Paul's speeches in Acts.[21] Based on the assumption that the book of Acts is an ancient historiography, it would appear that Paul's speeches reflect actual historical events but are not recorded verbatim. Instead, they are recounted and arranged by the author of Acts according to his own apologetic intent. Thus, the rhetorical strategies used might be either Paul's or Luke's, and the speeches are used for an intended purpose and audience.

Redefining the Subject of the Charge in View of the Purpose of the Speech

The *Apology*, in which Plato recounts Socrates's speeches in his trials, consists of three main parts that reflect judicial proceedings: the defense, the verdict of the jury and the sentencing of the court. The trial focuses on the accusations by Meletus, Anytus and Lycon concerning Socrates's impiety, specifically, his disbelief in the gods of the states and his corruption of young people. At the outset of his defense, however, Socrates introduces another charge and defends against it, a rhetorical strategy that Paul also uses in Act 26.

Concerning the charges in the *Apology*, Socrates distinguishes between two groups of accusers: past accusers, the people of Athens, who have been slandering Socrates, and more recent ones, namely, Meletus and his companions, who have been listening to them.[22] What triggered the initial accusation, Socrates claims, was prejudice and hostility toward him, in other words, discrimination, which was based on nothing other than Socrates's

20. Danzig, 'Apologizing for Socrates', p. 316.

21. There has long been an unresolved controversy within scholarship concerning the historicity of the speech of Socrates in Plato's *Apology*. On the one hand, some scholars argue that the *Apology* reflects the historical Socrates and his speech; others maintain that it is Plato's fiction. This issue regarding the *historical Socrates* in Plato parallels the dispute about the Lukan portrait of Paul. Skeptical scholars would disagree that Luke's portrayal of Paul and his speeches reflect the historical figure and events.

22. See Plato, *Apol*. 18 on the first accusation: 'There is a certain Socrates, a wise man, a ponderer over the things in the air, and one who has investigated the things beneath and who makes the weaker argument the stronger' (Fowler, LCL).

activity of inquiring and examining people concerning wisdom, thereby revealing their actual state (*Apol*. 22e-23a). As he explains, what led him to this examination was the Delphic oracle, which was given to his companion Chaerephon. On behalf of the god Apollo, Pythia proclaimed that no one was wiser in humanity than Socrates, and Socrates, who knew his ignorance well, departed with perplexity to seek the meaning of the oracle (21b-e). While wandering to seek out wisdom and truth, he realized that knowing his ignorance was the wisest form of human knowledge and that truth and wisdom were derived only from god, who was the wisest and most good.[23]

Interestingly, in this narration, Socrates does not jump to defend himself against Meletus's accusations. Instead, he raises another accusation against himself and brings forward the reason for it. At first glance, it seems uncommon to add an additional charge to the list of accusations brought against oneself and then respond to it, but that is what Socrates does. Moreover, throughout his defense, there is no mention of specific 'gods of the state', which were mentioned in the actual accusation. E. de Strycker and S.R. Slings further argue that Plato is evidently uninterested in the accusers' indictment, and such indifference is shown in the near absence of references to the content of the accusers' speeches in the *Apology*.[24]

It thus appears that the speech Socrates prepared for his trial was not intended to bear on the actual accusations brought against him. One might infer that even though he defends himself in court using the form of forensic defense oratory, his aim is not to receive a sentence of acquittal. This inference is further supported by the fact that, at the end of his speech, he is amazed that more jurors vote for his acquittal than he anticipated. James Colaiaco argues that, by employing the rhetorical device of defending himself against unrelated charges, Socrates can introduce essential issues relat-

23. See Plato, *Apol*. 20e: 'And men of Athens, do not interrupt me with noise, even if I seem to you to be boasting; for the word which I speak is not mine, but the speaker to whom I shall refer it is a person of weight. For of my wisdom—if it is wisdom at all—and of its nature, I will offer you the god of Delphi as a witness' (Fowler, LCL).

24. E. de Strycker and S.R. Slings, 'Plato's *Apology of Socrates*', in Rachana Kantekar (ed.), *Plato's Euthyphro, Apology and Crito: Critical Essays* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), pp. 72-96 (78).

ed to his philosophic mission.[25] Thus, the central purpose of Socrates's defense is to mark his own mission. Adding an accusation allows him to elaborate on what he wants to demonstrate in front of jurors and, more broadly, before Athenian citizens.

Similarly, Paul in Acts 26 redefines the subject of accusation to speak about the resurrection. In the previous chapters, which record his trial before Felix and Festus, Festus did not find any charge to lay against Paul. However, Paul appealed to Caesar, and King Agrippa expressed his interest in hearing Paul's defense. In 26.2, Paul clarifies that at this trial, he is going to defend himself against 'all the accusations of the Jews'. Previously, in the trial before Felix, recorded in Acts 24, Tertullus, as the representative of the Jews against Paul, uttered the accusation of sedition or 'stirring unrest'.[26]

However, in Acts 26, Paul begins by redefining the subject of the charge, saying that he was accused because of his hope in the resurrection, the promise 'made by God to our fathers' (26.6-7). His tactic of redefining the subject of the charge allows him to tell the story of his encounter with Jesus, the resurrected one, whom he presents as the fulfillment of the promise. Indeed, this story becomes the core of his defense in his trial before King Agrippa. The similarity with Socrates's tactic in the *Apology* is evident. By redefining the subject of the accusations, Socrates lays the foundation for telling the story of the Delphic oracle, which was the basis for his activities and, by implication, the accusations to which they led.

The Importance of Ethos and Establishing Persona as a Prophetical Philosopher

The character or ethos of the litigant is an essential feature of forensic oratory, and character description mainly involves biographical materials and human qualities.[27] According to Aristotle, in forensic rhetoric, 'the speaker

25. James A. Colaiaco, *Socrates against Athens: Philosophy on Trial* (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 55.

26. Craig S. Keener, 'Paul and Sedition: Pauline Apologetic in Acts', *BBR* 22 (2012), pp. 201-24 (209-10); cf. 'this man a pestilent fellow, an agitator among all the Jews throughout the world, and a ringleader of the sect of the Nazarenes. He even tried to profane the temple' (Acts 24.5-6, ESV).

27. Gerald Biesecker-Mast, 'Forensic Rhetoric and the Constitution of the Subject: Innocence, Truth and Wisdom in Gorgias' *Palamedes* and Plato's *Apology*', *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 24 (1994), pp. 148-66 (151).

should show himself to be certain and should know how to put the judge into a certain frame of mind … the speaker should show himself to be possessed of certain qualities and … his hearers should think that he is disposed of in a certain way toward them' (*Rhet*. 2.1.3.1377b; cf. 3.1417a16-19).[28]

In his monograph on character evidence in the classical Athenian courtrooms, Vasileios Adamidis explores the Greek conception of character and personality and confirms the wide use of specific patterns of portraying characters for forensic argumentations in the legal and quasi-legal fields as an essential strategy and method.[29] Thus, in ancient Greece, ethos was fundamental in forensic speech because 'being on trial in Athens really meant that one's character and life as a whole was on trial'.[30]

Establishing persona or *ethopoiia*, related to the portrayal of ethos, was not uncommon in Greco-Roman oratories and was used as a powerful means for persuasion. For example, Cicero frequently employed his persona

28. Aristotle writes, 'The narration should indicate character. This will be so if we know what makes for the character. One way, certainly, is based on what sort of choice. And the choice is what it is because of the end aimed at … The man who wishes to persuade people will not be negligent as to the matter of character; no, on the contrary, he will apply himself above all to establish a most honorable name among his fellow citizens; for who does not know that words carry greater conviction when spoken by men of good repute than when spoken by men who live under a cloud and that the argument which is made by a man's life is of more weight than that which is furnished by words?' (*Rhet*. 3.1417a 16-19). Aristotle also explains that a speaker's character as revealed in speech 'may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses' (*Rhet*. 1356a 12-13). He also writes, '[P]ersuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him more credible' (*Rhet*. 1356a 4-5).

29. Vasileios Adamidis writes, 'In an era when proof beyond doubt was not facilitated by technological means, other forms of evidence (such as circumstantial demonstrating probability) gained ground. Of these alternative forms, character was the most trustworthy. Belief in the unity of virtue or vice induced litigants to highlight their good traits and their opponent's reprehensible ones' (*Character Evidence in the Courts of Classical Athens: Rhetoric, Relevance and the Rule of Law* [London: Routledge, 2017], p. 222).

30. Halvard Fossheim, 'The Character of Socrates in Plato's *Apology*: An Aristotelian Analysis', in *Readings of Plato's Apology of Socrates: Defending the Philosophical Life*, pp. 121-36 (123).

in his forensic speeches as a rhetorical strategy.[31] Such a strategy is also present in the *Apology*. Slings argues that the entire *Apology* is about the portrait of Socrates, and the speech as a whole contributes to the aim of illustrating Socrates's thinking about the human situation and its problems.[32] Ågotnes regards the outline of Plato's *Apology* as showing Socrates's intention: to demonstrate that he and his philosophy are beneficial to the city. Moreover, to depict Socrates as a radical and superior figure, Plato uses rhetorical devices of hyperbole, silence and ambiguity.[33]

Throughout the *Apology*, Socrates is dramatically portrayed as the wisest human being, divinely ordained as the recipient and interpreter of a revelation and the servant of a god who carries out his mission given by that god.[34] The portrayal is carefully built up into the presentation of a prophetic pious philosopher who faithfully follows god's will. As an agent of the divine continuously communicating with divinity, Socrates even calls on god as his witness in the trial scene.

By building up the character and personality of Socrates, Plato also provided a portrayal of a mediator between god and humans. Socrates refers to himself as a 'gift from god' (30e-31a), and his mission is caring and helping people realize the virtues of wisdom and truth. His ultimate aim and goal were to lead other people, even non-Greek persons, to be wise by acknowledging their own ignorance. It is noteworthy that in Xenophon's *Apology*, Socrates had already begun his examination of people long before the oracle

31. Joanna Kenty, *Cicero's Political Personae* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), who argues that, by establishing *personae*, the orator reveals 'the inner workings and hidden foundations' of their strategies in speech' (14). Adamidis stresses the significance of establishing a speaker's character, using the example of Isocrates's *Antidosis* (*Character Evidence*, p. 278).

32. S.R. Slings, *Plato's Apology of Socrates: A Literary and Philosophical Study with a Running Commentary* (Leiden: Brill, 1994), pp. 7-8.

33. Ågotnes, 'Plato's Socrates in the *Apology*', p. 72.

34. In Plato, *Apol*. 40a-b, Socrates describes himself as a seer ('For hitherto the customary prophetic monitor always spoke to me very frequently and opposed me even in very small matters … but it has not opposed me in anything I was doing or saying' (Fowler, LCL).

(Xenophon, *Apol*. 14–17).[35] The portrayal of Socrates as the divinely ordained prophetic philosopher can thus be read as a combination of Socrates's self-characterization and Plato's touch.

Meanwhile, Danzig states that Plato's method of outlining Socrates's thoughts and way of life presents Socrates as a hero and idealized philosopher, willing to risk the ultimate sacrifice in service to god.[36] Based on this portrayal, Socrates's death is described as the modality that fits a philosophical hero, which god has been keeping in store for him.[37] Interestingly, Jacob Howland argues that the illustration of the trial of Socrates in the *Apology* bears a striking resemblance to the outline of Euripides's *Hercules furens* in its combination of 'heroic resoluteness and ironic lightness' with the features of purification, error, reversal and recognition.[38] According to Howland, Plato's Socrates is portrayed as a tragic hero like Hercules, who fights for justice and undertakes suffering by slanderers.[39]

Contrary to the portrayal of Socrates by Plato, the accusers or antagonists in the *Apology* are described as 'slanderers'. In particular, highlighting a rhetorical function of questions in Attic oratories used both to attack the opponents and to strengthen a favorable portrayal of the speaker himself, Andreas Serafim maintains that Socrates's interrogation of Meletus (esp. 24c-34d) serves 'ethos-depicting' in the *Apology* by undermining Meletus's persona while depicting Socrates positively.[40] Meletus, a representative of

35. John Bussanich, 'Socrates' Religious Experiences', in John Bussanich and Nicholas D. Smith (eds.), *The Bloomsbury Companion to Socrates* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), pp. 276-300 (280).

36. Danzig, 'Apologizing for Socrates', pp. 282, 314.

37. Stefano Jedrkiewicz, 'A Literary Challenge: How to Represent Socrates' Daimonion', in Alessandro Stavru and Christopher Moore (eds.), *Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue* (Leiden: Brill, 2018), pp. 299-318 (311).

38. Jacob Howland, 'Socrates' Daimonic Ethics: Myth and Heroism in Plato's *Apology*', in *Readings of Plato's Apology of Socrates: Defending the Philosophical Life*, pp. 89-100 (91-92).

39. Howland, 'Socrates' Daimonic Ethics', p. 97.

40. Andreas Serafim, 'The Questions in (Answering the Question about the Historicity of) Plato's *Apology of Socrates*', in Andreas Markantonatos, Vasileios Liotsakis and Andreas Serafim (eds.), *Witnesses and Evidence in Ancient Greek Literature* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2021), pp. 135-53 (139), who finds notable parallels of interrogation in the *Apology* with *Lysias* 24–26.

the accusers, is portrayed through cross-examination as a practitioner of sophistry characterized by flattery, pandering and self-contradiction.[41] Through the interrogation, it is demonstrated that Meletus is unable to answer Socrates's question, and as a result, he is a slanderer. Furthermore, refuting the accusation by Meletus, Socrates revises the concept of piety, arguing that as the recipient of the revelation of god, he is the most pious and wisest man. Eventually, it is revealed that the really impious man is Meletus, not Socrates, reversing the accusation. 'His [Socrates's] is [the] only real piety, he claims, and to try to stop him is itself impious.'[42]

As for Paul in Acts, he identifies himself as a Pharisee beginning in 23.6 with his interrogation at the Sanhedrin, seeking unity with the Pharisees after he failed to persuade the Jews in Acts 22. Paul's Pharisaism provides him with several benefits in his defense speeches, one of them being that he can establish his character as a devout Jew who faithfully studies Scripture and is far from being involved in any political riots. Moreover, as an expert on Scripture, Paul can argue that his encounter with the resurrected one amounts to an irrefutable experience as it points to the fulfillment of prophecy.

Analyzing Paul's speech in Acts 24, Keener points out Paul's rhetorical strategy of reversing his charge of sedition to lay the blame on his accusers: 'Paul seems to contrast his peaceful behavior in the temple (24:17-18) with that of his original accusers (24:18b).'[43] It is likely that Paul in Acts 26 again uses a similar strategy but in a different way. Adopting the strategy of division at this point, he distinguishes his present self from his old self in the past with the standard of his critical experience with Jesus.[44] By vividly

41. Lynette Reid Smith, 'The Interrogation of Meletus: *Apology* 24c4–28a1', *ClQ* 45 (1995), pp. 372-88 (385-86, 388). Investigating Plato's characterization of Meletus, Smith says, 'Plato is … a good master … of the art of giving depth and vivid reality to his characters by means of a subtle portrayal of their manner of speaking' (373).

42. C. Emlyn-Jones, 'Socrates, Plato, and Piety', *Mediterranean Studies* 2 (1990), pp. 21-28 (24).

43. Craig S. Keener, 'Some Rhetorical Techniques in Acts 24:2-21', in Stanley E. Porter (ed.), *Paul's World* (Pauline Studies, 4; Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 221-51 (246).

44. According to Michalopoulos *et al*., like the rhetorical strategy of unity, by using the rhetoric of division, which is frequently used especially in religious dis-

illustrating his persecution of the Christians, Paul claims that such violent actions against the 'saints' or 'holy ones' were executed under the chief priest's authority. In my opinion, Paul probably wants to show that his distorted zeal for God was enacted under the authority of the high priests of Judaism, who are now accusing him. By confessing his past wrong thinking (and wrongdoing) of opposing the name of Jesus of Nazareth, he places all those who still oppose Jesus on the side of blindness and darkness.[45]

The stark contrast between distorted belief due to blindness or darkness and the current state of seeing and knowing what is true in light bears a similarity to the contrast between acknowledging one's ignorance, which Socrates presents as the highest form of human wisdom, and true wisdom, which is derived from god. The authority and commission of the chief priests (26.12) contrast starkly with the authority whereby Paul is commissioned to preach to the gentiles. In a manner similar to Socrates, who interrogates Meletus to reveal the impiety of his accuser, Paul juxtaposes the commissioning of Jesus and that of his accusers, the high priest, to substantiate his claim that they are the wrongdoers and wrong thinkers in the eyes of God, thus reversing the charges against him. As a consequence, Paul's portrayal of the current character is further accentuated by the diminishing of his past life (old self), which is linked to his accusers.

Unlike the account given in Acts 22, the relating of Paul's encounter with Jesus in Acts 26 does not mention his becoming blind afterward. Still, Paul records Jesus as saying that he (Jesus) would help Israel and the gentiles to open their eyes (26.18); thus, the character and mission of Paul are confirmed. Significantly, Paul is here portrayed as one who stands in line

courses, a 'speaker can divide an audience from them using strategies of alienation' in terms of values and ideologies (Andreas N. Michalopoulos *et al*., 'Unity and Division in Ancient Literature: Current Perspectives and Further Research', in Andreas N. Michalopoulos *et al*. [eds.], *The Rhetoric of Unity and Division in Ancient Literature* [Berlin: de Gruyter, 2021], pp. 1-18 [2]).

45. Establishing one's own identity and juxtaposing others' identity is also shown in Demosthenes's *Philippica i–iv*. According to Sarah Bremner, Demosthenes in his speeches uses frequently 'the rhetoric of identity' as a 'strategy of establishing an identity based on [success in] past actions and then criticizing the Athenians for deviating from it' ('The Rhetoric of Athenian Identity in Demosthenes' Early Assembly Speeches', *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 60 [2020], pp. 544-73 [544-45]).

with the Old Testament prophets Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel and Daniel.[46] Thus, Paul's persona is presented as a Pharisaic prophet who has faithfully believed what was written in Scripture and is divinely ordained by Jesus and obedient to God's commission. As a prophetic missionary, Paul becomes a witness who testifies to and proclaims the resurrection of Jesus and God's plan for the salvation of the world.

Furthermore, as in the trial of Socrates, Paul's trial in Acts 26 characterizes him as a mediator between God and humankind. Prophets in the Old Testament period functioned as mediators to deliver the will and truth of God to people who were still in a state of ignorance; likewise, Paul is sent by God as a mediator to help people 'open their eyes, so that they may turn from darkness to light and from the power of Satan to God, that they may receive forgiveness of sins and a place among those who are sanctified by faith' (26.18 ESV). Interestingly, Ananias once functioned as a mediator of God, and Paul is now functioning this way in his absence in the story. Luke's way of establishing the persona and character of Paul as a prophet and mediator is thus strengthened.

In Paul's dialogue with King Agrippa after his defense speech, Paul confidently says, "I pray to God that not only you but also all who hear me this day might become such as I am—except for these chains" (26.29 ESV). Here, like Socrates who is presented as an example to people who would seek wisdom, Paul becomes a model for those who do not yet know the resurrected one but might be drawn toward him on account of hearing Paul's story.

Divine Intervention as a Rhetorical Strategy

In the *Apology*, the Delphic oracle concerning Socrates is critical to his defense. Socrates claims that he has been the recipient of 'oracles and dreams and every way in which any other divinity has ever commanded a human

46. Keener, *Acts*, IV, pp. 3512-17; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *The Acts of the Apostles: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (AB, 18; New York: Doubleday, 1998), p. 759; F.F. Bruce, *The Book of the Acts* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, rev. edn, 1988), p. 467; C.K. Barrett, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles 15–28: Vol. 2* (ICC; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1998), pp. 1158-61.

being to do anything whatsoever' (33c).[47] Stefano Jedrkiewicz lists the defining features of the oracle, which indicate it is a divine sign (*daimonion*): first, it has a divine origin; second, it is benevolent and beneficial; third, it is directly relevant to Socrates's way of life, thought and especially death; and fourth, it confirms Socrates's heroic nature.[48]

Moreover, Socrates primarily focuses on speaking truth to the jurors and attributes this truth not to himself but to god. As Tennant notes, speaking the truth is a significant rhetorical strategy among the standard forensic topics in that it provides an essential criterion for demonstrating how a speaker accomplishes an aim.[49] Socrates confirms that he tells only the truth in his trial (18a, 20d, 22b, 28a, 32a and 33c) and claims this truth was given to him by god (e.g. 'Clearly he [god] is not lying for that would not be right of him' [21b]). According to Socrates, god is the origin of wisdom (23a), and he cares about human souls (30e-31c), and this premise is the basis of his defense discourse. Thus, while Socrates employs a typical rhetorical device—namely, speaking the truth—alongside his appeal to divine intervention, he uses it subversively.[50]

This observation raises a question about how Socrates harmonizes his critical reasoning, a fundamental feature for his examination activity, with his religious experience and his respect for cultural values with action based on god's commission. A.A. Long argues that divine signs or revelation pro-

47. In addition to oracles, Socrates also mentions a divine sign (Plato, *Apol*. 40c, 41d), voice (31d) and 'something divine' (31c, 40a).

48. Jedrkiewicz, 'Literary Challenge', p. 300.

49. According to Tennant, standard forensic topoi consist of the following: 'a) a litigant's customary expression of disbelief and astonishment at his opponent's position, b) the usual disclaimer of rhetorical ability, and c) the oft-repeated promise to tell the jurors the truth' ('Plato's *Apology*', p. 45). Emlyn-Jones ('Socrates, Plato, and Piety', pp. 23-24) also points out that although Socrates begins by disclaiming any oratorical skills and conventions, saying that he will tell the truth straightforwardly, such a claim 'actually operates a clever argumentative strategy'.

50. As Tennant writes, 'it is ironic that by demonstrating to what heights forensic oratory might aspire—the potential vindication of philosophy as a way of life—Plato ultimately accomplished his (and Socrates') mission to such a degree that the speech is scarcely considered to be a piece of forensic oratory' ('Plato's *Apology*', p. 49).

vide Socrates with 'intuitive certainty' and rational ground concerning his contemplation and action.[51] For Socrates, therefore, there is no conflict between his readiness to follow both reason and divine command because the oracle has 'sufficient epistemic significance' to establish it as the exclusive authority of reason.[52] Moreover, only by using reason can Socrates grasp the meaning of divine signs.[53] Thus, one can conclude that, in his speeches, Socrates takes his reasoning and dedication to cultural values to be consistent with his religiousness, or the latter as even trumping his power of reasoning.[54] While Socrates believes that his action enhances and exalts Athenian citizens' souls, Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith observe the following:

> [t]he *daimonion* … did not necessarily nullify Socrates' ideas about what would and what would not be good for the city or his fellow citizens. But it nullified (trumped) Socrates' apparent commitment to the idea that he was in a position to do something worthwhile in promoting his ideas in Athens' political institutions, an idea he surely did not come to purely impulsively.[55]

Likewise, for Paul, his encounter with Jesus is the core of his defense in Acts 26. Moreover, a similar relationship exists between his faithfulness to Scripture and his experience of the resurrected Christ. Although the experience itself was sovereign insofar as it was initiated by Jesus himself, Paul

51. A.A. Long, 'How Does Socrates' Divine Sign Communicate with Him?' in Sara Ahbel-Rappe and Rachana Kamtekar (eds.), *A Companion to Socrates* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 63-74 (67, 73); Gregory Vlastos, 'Socratic Piety', in Nicholas D. Smith and Paul B. Woodruff (eds.), *Reason and Religion in Socratic Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 55-73 (59); Plato, *Apol*. 22b-c ('so again in the case of the poets also I presently recognized this, that what they composed they composed not by wisdom, but by nature and because they were inspired, like the prophets and givers of oracles; for these also say many fine things but know none of the things they say,' Fowler, LCL).

52. Mark L. McPherran, *The Religion of Socrates* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1996), pp. 191, 194.

53. Vlastos, 'Socratic Piety', p. 62.

54. Long, 'How Does Socrates' Divine Sign Communicate with Him?' p. 68.

55. Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, 'Socrates' Gods and the Daimonion', in Nicholas D. Smith and Paul B. Woodruff (eds.), *Reason and Religion in Socratic Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 83.

understands it as the fulfillment of the Scripture. In the same vein, there is no disjunction between Paul's mission work as a servant and witness of Jesus and his Jewish values and inheritances because that to which he testified was 'nothing but what the prophets and Moses said would come to pass' (26.22 ESV). Thus, Paul, like Socrates, is not worried about the charges leveled against him because he is acting under divine authority.

A primary difference between them is that the oracle that Socrates passed on to others was not given in an imperative form. Rather, it was Socrates who interpreted the meaning of the oracle and departed with puzzlement before realizing his divine mission and becoming god's servant. By contrast, Paul was given a more specific commandment. As Mark L. McPherran writes, the oracle Socrates received was descriptive, whereas Paul's encounter with Jesus was prescriptive.[56]

As a result, in both cases of Socrates and Paul, divine intervention played a significant role in fortifying their defenses, thereby underscoring their ethos and justifying their respective missions.

The Mission of Paul and Socrates: The Highest Priority in Life

Highlighting a characteristic of preaching in Socrates's speech, Roslyn Weiss points out that, unlike Plato's other works on Socrates, which consist of typical moral inquiry with definitional questions and dialogues, here in the *Apology*, Plato focuses more on Socrates's self-understanding and mission.[57] According to *Apol*. 33c, the content of Socrates's mission as assigned by god consists of interrogating and examining others about wisdom, and his commitment to this mission is well presented in 29d.[58] According

56. See Mark L. McPherran, 'Elenctic Interpretation and the Delphic Oracle', in Gary Alan Scott (ed.), *Does Socrates Have a Method? Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato's Dialogues and Beyond* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2002), pp. 114-44, where McPherran explains the descriptive nature of the oracle in the *Apology*: 'what the oracle provided was "information" that stimulated a lifetime's occupation of interpretation, disconfirmation, and confirmation, a task that as it continued allowed Socrates to fix more exactly the scope and degree of effort and sacrifice that piety required of him' (140).

57. Roslyn Weiss, 'Socrates: Seeker or Preacher?' in *A Companion to Socrates*, pp. 243-53 (243).

58. Plato, *Apol*. 29d ('I, men of Athens, respect you and love you, but I will obey the god rather than you, and while I live and am able to continue, I shall never

to Socrates's speech, as god's servant, his mission was to enlighten and awaken people by removing the pretense of wisdom that caused their deficiency.[59] When Socrates realizes the implication of the Delphic oracle, he decides to lead others to the truth by prompting them to realize their ignorance.[60] Emphasizing the more religious aspect of the speech, Gregory Vlastos argues that the god in the *Apology* needs someone with 'the right beliefs', who 'can read signs correctly to assist the god by doing on his behalf for the people of Athens what the god in his boundless goodwill for them would be doing himself in person'.[61]

Socrates's ordained missions related to the Delphic oracle constitute the core of his defense in the trial, emphasizing its irrefutable and irresistible nature. Asserting his activity as carrying out a 'duty to the god' with divine

give up philosophy or stop exhorting you and pointing out the truth to any one of you whom I may meet, saying in my accustomed way'); 33c ('[T]he practice of interrogating those who think they are wise, but actually are not, has been commanded to me, as I maintain, by the god through divinations and through dreams and every other means through which divine apportionment has ever commanded anyone to do anything'). Brickhouse and Smith draw out Socrates's mission in more detail (see 'The Origin of Socrates' Mission', *JHI* 44 [1983], pp. 657-66)—they write, 'he must free men from their pretense of wisdom (23b, e, 28e, 38a) and exhort them to care rather for its actual attainment, for truth, and for the perfection of their souls (29e) … he must also attempt to free them from the bondage of their concern for material things (29e-30b) and urge them to strive for the possession of that most precious good: virtue (30a, 31b)' (657). See also Robert Metcalf, 'The Philosophical Rhetoric of Socrates' Mission', *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 37 (2004), pp. 143-66, who writes, 'the major content of Socrates' defense is his doing and speaking were a matter of obeying divine directive' (146).

59. Brickhouse and Smith, 'Origin of Socrates' Mission', p. 664; McPherran, 'Elenctic Interpretation', p. 117.

60. Additionally, Socrates says, 'I thought I must consider the god's business of the highest importance' (Plato, *Apol*. 21e). In 28e–29a, he says, 'but when the god gave me a station, as I believed and understood, with orders to spend my life in philosophy and in examining myself and others, then I were to desert my post through fear of death or anything else whatsoever; that would indeed be strange.'

61. Vlastos, 'Socratic Piety', p. 63. Vlastos also points out that such a conception of piety is radical and subversive to traditional Greek belief, which is closely intertwined with magic and mainly connected to ritualistic acts intended to induce supernatural powers to achieve an individual's own wishes (p. 64).

approval, Socrates effectively demonstrates his philosophical life of examination as the exclusive relationship with god.[62] Socrates's piety and innocence are thus defended by his mission on behalf of god. For these reasons, Socrates has complete confidence in his mission, claiming that he is 'a gift of the god to the city' because he cares about the soul of Athenian citizens, 'approaching each one of you like a father or an elder brother to persuade you to care for virtue' (31a-b).[63] Socrates believes that his mission assigned by god makes Athenian citizens happy (36e). He is even fearless before death because there is great proof (40c) that death is not evil but rather a good thing for him (40a-c).

Furthermore, according to Socrates, death is no loss because, if the sayings of men are true, his soul will be relocated to another place. In that case, Socrates imagines that he will be able to continue his mission, conversing with those who have died and thus continuing to lead others to wisdom (41c). Therefore, rather than stopping to investigate and examine the truth and question people, it is better for him to choose death. Following this discourse, it is apparent that Socrates is not only proving his innocence in his trial but also defending his mission before god. Metcalf concludes that 'neither the courts nor the public can ultimately determine innocence or guilt; only god can decide. Hence, the *Apology* subject is positioned at odds with the accusers by an account of his identification with god.'[64]

This identification with god serves another rhetorical purpose. By bringing forth god as the active agent of all his movements, Socrates shifts attention from his own role in his mission to the role and activity of god, making divinity responsible for the charge.[65] Socrates merely performs faithful service and devotion to god, as he has always done. Being unable to resist god's commission, Socrates has obeyed god, thus sacrificing his life to become poor (23b). In view of this identification with his mission, Metcalf argues that it would be more appropriate to say that in his speech, Socrates is

62. Emlyn-Jones, 'Socrates, Plato, and Piety'; Richard Kraut, 'The Examined Life', in *A Companion to Socrates*, pp. 228-42 (229).

63. Socrates also describes his activity as 'coming to the aid of the god' (Plato, *Apol*. 23b) and 'service to the god' (23c). He also adds, 'the greatest good of man is daily to converse about virtue' (38a).

64. Metcalf, 'Philosophical Rhetoric', p. 154.

65. Metcalf, 'Philosophical Rhetoric', p. 146.

the instrument of divine activities rather than the agent.[66] For Socrates, god's sign and voice are absolute and irresistible.

A similar statement might be said about Paul's understanding of his mission in Acts 26. As commanded by Jesus, this mission is to testify with his whole life to the gospel of Christ, especially his suffering and resurrection (28.16, 23), and to proclaim repentance to Israel and gentiles (26.20) by helping them 'to open their eyes so that they may turn from darkness to light and from the power of Satan to God, so that they may receive forgiveness of sins' (26.18 ESV). Paul is not able to be disobedient to the 'heavenly vision' (26.19 ESV) because the main agent of the mission is God and the mission itself is proclaiming the fulfillment of Scripture (26.22). The discourse in his defense is thus very similar to that of Socrates. Granted, Paul's life is radically changed as a result of his divine mandate.

Having witnessed the resurrected Christ, he now sees his mission as witnessing to Jesus, whereas previously he had persecuted the followers of Christ. However, even though a similar statement cannot be made about Socrates, the parallel between realizing that one was wrong (Paul) and acknowledging one's own ignorance (Socrates) can hardly be overlooked. For Socrates, arriving at divine wisdom means knowing that one knows nothing, and this is the message he intends to convey to others by questioning them about what they presume to know. Thus, both Paul and Socrates can both be viewed as men commissioned and sent by God as interpreters and prophets to help people arrive at divine truth, that is, the truth that lies outside of the individual and is, therefore, absolute. Socrates held that this truth was a matter of divine wisdom; hence, arriving at it required realizing one's human ignorance. Paul believed that this truth was found in Christ, the resurrected one; thus, knowing the truth meant having faith in him.

Forensic Defense Oratory Containing Deliberative Rhetoric

As mentioned above, since Plato's *Apology* is not actual oratory for the court but a later recount of Socrates's speech by Plato, it has intertwined Socrates's defense and Plato's (and Socrates's) exhortations. Slings points out that although Plato used judicial speech, he wanted the reader to be continually surprised and puzzled by ideas that did not seem to conform to his

66. Metcalf, 'Philosophical Rhetoric', p. 146.

chosen literary form.[67] Ioannis Perysinakis also notices a mixed nature of the *Apology*, saying that 'although it appears as a judicial discourse … the *Apology* … goes well beyond conventional forensic speeches in serving as a defense, an encomium, and an exhortation to philosophize all at once.'[68]

Regarding Socrates's defense in the trials, many scholars have pointed out that his refutation was not meant to allow him to escape the death penalty by effectively persuading jurors but rather to improve the overall sense of ethics and morality in Athens.[69] For example, Kazutaka Kondo argues that, in the very beginning of his speech, Socrates does not aim at his acquittal but at raising the reputation of his philosophical life.[70] Weiss analyzes Socrates's speech, saying that it has three purposes—exhortation, refutation and examination—which together constitute the nature of preaching.[71] He thus likens Socrates to a preacher and argues that 'at the core of Socratic moral inquiry … is Socrates' attempt to get his interlocutors to think as he does.'[72] De Strycker and Slings list the contents of the exhortation in Socrates's speech, showing its pedagogical aims in detail.[73]

67. Slings, *Plato's Apology of Socrates*, p. 180.

68. Ioannis N. Perysinakis, 'Plato's *Apology of Socrates*: The Rhetoric of Socrates' Defense and the Foundation of the Ancient Quarrel between Philosophy and Poetry', in Andreas Markantonatos, Vasileios Liotsakis and Andreas Serafim (eds.), *Witnesses and Evidence in Ancient Greek Literature* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2021), pp. 154-84 (157).

69. Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, *Socrates on Trial* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). pp. 37-47; Colaiaco, *Socrates against Athens*, pp. 1-11.

70. Kazutaka Kondo, 'Socrates' Rhetorical Strategy in Plato's *Apology*', *Athens Journal of Humanities & Arts* 1 (2014), pp. 323-34 (324).

71. Weiss, 'Socrates: Seeker or Preacher?' p. 247.

72. Weiss, 'Socrates: Seeker or Preacher?' p. 252.

73. de Strycker and Slings, 'Plato's *Apology of Socrates*', pp. 84-85. This list is here presented: '1. An educator should possess knowledge; 2. Virtue has a civic as well as a personal aspect; 3. There are three states of mind with regard to knowledge a) conceited ignorance b) consciousness of one's ignorance and striving for insight c) perfect knowledge. Only God possesses perfect knowledge; 4. Talent and inspirations are not knowledge; 5. Skill … is different from knowledge; 6. Nobody harms himself knowingly and willingly; 7 virtue or goodness … legitimizes power; 9. in virtue, the intellectual and the volitional aspect are inseparable; 10. There is a threefold scale of values—wealth, glory, knowledge. Virtue consists in acknowl-

In 29d-e, Socrates exhorts his audience that, as Athenians, 'from the city that is greatest and best reputed for wisdom and strength', they should turn to the prudence and truth to care for their own soul; and in 30a-b, he emphasizes that his devotion to god benefits the Athenians because his activities are for the perfection of their souls, which they should care about more than their persons or their property. He moreover argues that virtue does not come from money, but money comes from virtue. In 31b and 36c, he likens himself to a 'father' or 'older brother' who advises people to care for their souls. On the other hand, in 39c-d, he presents himself as a prophetic figure, warning others about their future after his death.

According to McPherran, Socrates ultimately urges Athenian citizens to pursue his own model of life to be freed from 'their pretensions to wisdom' (23b, 23e, 28e and 38a) and 'overly zealous care for material things' (29e-39b) and thus achieve the 'perfection of the soul' (29e).[74] Socrates's life, character and service to god done on the benevolent god's behalf were intended to benefit his fellow citizens so that they could be released from egocentricity, and thus, at this moment of his defense speech, Socrates still exhorts the people of Athens to live as himself lived.[75] Based on these arguments, one can conclude that Plato's depiction of Socrates's trial was primarily intended to illuminate people as to the nature of truth and wisdom and where these virtues originate. As a result, although Plato utilizes the genre of forensic speech, this speech also has a deliberative function, including philosophical, pedagogical and apologetic.

Like Socrates, Paul also appeals to his own life as an example to be imitated in his defense before King Agrippa (26.29). This becomes evident in the latter part of his speech, where Paul's role changes from that of a witness to the risen Christ to a person who is testifying to Christ's suffering and resurrection from the dead as promised by God (26.22-23). Thus, his audience now becomes the object of his testifying and exhortation about Jesus and his resurrection.

edging the superiority of the higher good to the lower one; 11. Inferior goods depend on superior goods; virtue cannot be automatically transferred from teacher to pupil and it is always the object of personal choice.'

74. McPherran, 'Elenctic Interpretation', p. 117 n. 8.

75. Gregory Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 176.

It is worth noting the response of both Festus and King Agrippa after Paul's defense. For Festus, Paul's defense is regarded as odd because he does not defend himself against the subject of accusation but focuses on Jesus and his resurrection. However, King Agrippa seems to understand quite well Paul's hidden intention in his forensic defense speech, as he asks Paul, 'Would you persuade me to be a Christian?' (26.28 ESV). As he realizes, if he himself believes in the prophets, he should, according to Paul, also believe in the testimony about Jesus and his resurrection. And for Luke, through Paul's exhortations in his defense speech, he would have intended to highlight the virtuous life of Paul, who dedicated himself entirely to the mission entrusted to him by God, simultaneously to achieve his apologetic purpose for early Christianity, related to Judaism.

Conclusion

Throughout this paper, my primary aim was not to prove that Paul's speech in Acts 26 bears an explicit intertextual resemblance to Plato's *Apology*. Instead, I wanted to explore how the author, Luke, used in Acts 22–26 an ancient literary form, forensic defense speech, and its strategies to achieve certain purposes. In this process, it has been demonstrated that there are meaningful similarities in the way of presenting their speeches between the *Apology* and Paul's speech in Acts 26. Historiography, the genre Luke chose for his account of the early Christian movement, was well known in the Greco-Roman world, as it also was the framework of forensic speech. It might be unsurprising, then, that Paul's defense speech in Acts 26 shows meaningful similarities with Plato's *Apology*. In particular, furthermore, scholars' discovery of Luke's emphasis on the Socratic figure throughout Acts, in order to illustrate the apostles, especially Paul, increases the likelihood of echoes from the *Apology* in Acts 26.

Although adhering to the conventions of forensic defense speech, Socrates's and Paul's manifest unique features that are contingent upon the speaker's personal circumstances and the literary context, thereby reflecting the authors' distinct aims. As (quasi) forensic oratory, both speeches establish the speaker's character and emphasize the speaker's mission as divinely ordained and irrefutable to anyone who will listen to reason, which in Paul's case, means anyone of an orthodox Jewish mindset. Although much more so for Paul, their experiences with divinity become, in both cases, the turning

point for their entire lives and simultaneously the reason for the accusations. Moreover, in both cases, their primary purpose in giving a defense is not to acquit themselves of wrongdoing but to justify their missions. Thus, their forensic speeches also have a deliberative function, namely, to urge their respective audiences to leave their old way of life and seek truth, namely, divine truth, which from the perspective of the reader, can be understood as having relevance for all future generations.